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Overview 
Australian government budgets are under pressure. In the next 10 
years, they are at significant risk of posting deficits of around 4 
per cent of GDP. That means finding savings and tax increases of 
$60 billion a year. This alarming task is not impossible, but it will 
require tougher choices than those made over the last decade.  
Over the economic cycle of boom and bust, balanced budgets are 
much better than the alternative. Persistent government deficits 
incur interest payments, and limit future borrowings. As a result 
they can unfairly shift costs between generations, and reduce 
flexibility in a crisis. Yet in good times it is hard for governments to 
run a surplus. They are invariably tempted to spend money. Many 
voters prefer outcomes with no obvious losers.  
On published figures, government budgets are close to balanced. 
But this masks significant problems. Our analysis examines the 
budgets of the Commonwealth and the three largest State 
governments as a whole. It investigates trends over the next 
decade, and reveals serious pressures that put our prosperity at 
risk. The greatest come from sustained increases in spending, 
especially in health. Over the past decade health expenditure rose 
by over $40 billion in real terms. The ageing population was not 
the prime cause. Rather, people of any age saw doctors more 
often, had more tests and operations and took more prescription 
drugs.  
Demography also had relatively little impact on Age Pension costs 
because more older people worked, and this trend is likely to 
continue. However, new policies increased Aged Pension benefits 
and widened eligibility. If these trends continue, they will increase 
expenditures by another 0.5 per cent of GDP. On top of this, 
inequality may well rise after the mining boom ends, creating 
pressure to increase welfare payments, a trend evident overseas 
when inequality has grown. 
Governments and oppositions have raised expectations of 
substantial new expenditures on the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme, schools, additional paid parental leave, and northern 
infrastructure, among other policies. Even a subset of these could 
well cost 0.5 per cent of GDP. 
To be sustainable, current budgets need to be in surplus. 
Underlying revenues are weaker than they seem. Company and 
mining taxes, and carbon price revenues are likely to be 1 per 
cent of GDP – $15 billion a year – less than current forecasts. 
Current revenues are inflated by the mining boom and Australia’s 
high terms of trade. If, as many predict, minerals prices fall, 
government revenues will fall by another 1 per cent of GDP.  
With these pressures, responsible leaders will need to find 4 per 
cent of GDP in savings and tax increases to balance their books 
by 2023. What can they do to bridge the gap? Smaller 
government will not necessarily improve Australia’s budget 
balances. Substantial increases in productivity and participation, 
while welcome, are also unlikely to solve the problem. Instead, 
history suggests that only tough policy choices can substantially 
improve government budgets. But it will require courageous 
leaders, as well as new institutional arrangements and mindsets. 
A forthcoming Grattan Institute report will examine the options. 
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1. The challenge for Australian government budgets 
Australian government budgets are under substantial pressure.  
The result could drag budgets back from a projected surplus of 1 
per cent of GDP from 2015-16 onwards to a deficit of more than 4 
per cent of GDP, or $60 billion in today’s terms. Figure 1 
summarises these pressures. 
Figure 1: Projected 2023 budget balance for Australian 
governments by 2023 given plausible scenarios 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis.  See Figure 51 in Appendix B for detail. 
1. A combination of signature policy initiatives (Gonski school 
reforms and the National Disability Insurance Scheme, or paid 
parental leave and Direct Action) and other proposals with 
significant backing (e.g. increasing Newstart and restoring 
defence spending) could easily increase expenses by 0.5 to 1 
per cent of GDP.  
2. Health expenses are likely to increase by 2 per cent of GDP 
as their growth over the last decade continues, driven 
primarily not by an ageing population, as many believe, but by 
the increase in the scope and volume of health services.  
3. Additional welfare payments to hold inequality at current levels 
would increase government spending by 0.5 to 2 per cent of 
GDP – assuming that the current tight targeting of welfare 
continues. 
4. Company tax collection may be 0.5 per cent of GDP less than 
currently forecast because of unbudgeted deductions for 
accelerated depreciation, and company income depressed by 
lower minerals prices while the Australian dollar remains 
unusually high. 
5. Revenue from new sources – carbon pricing and the Minerals 
Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) – appear likely to collect at least 
0.5 to 1 per cent of GDP less than forecast. 
6. A future fall in minerals prices, and thus the terms of trade, 
may reduce revenue by 1 to 2 per cent of GDP. 
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Some of these issues are already playing out. There are 
indications that budget outcomes and forecasts will be lowered 
materially in May 2013 by about 1 per cent of GDP,1 reflecting 
some of the revenue issues in points 4 to 6 above. 
In the remainder of this paper: 
x Chapter 2 explains why continued budget deficits are a 
problem; 
x Chapter 3 provides an overview of Australian government 
budgets; 
x Chapter 4 describes the expenditure pressures over the last 
decade; 
x Chapter 5 describes the increasing revenue pressures over 
the last decade; 
x Chapter 6 describes the external pressures over the last 
decade; 
x Chapter 7 outlines some of the future pressures for Australian 
government budgets; 
x Chapter 8 scopes the potential to close the gap, and 
concludes that difficult budgetary policy choices are inevitable; 
x Appendix A presents more detailed analysis of current 
Commonwealth and State budgets; 
                                            
1 Swan (2013) 
x Appendix B explains the approach we have used for budget 
analysis; 
x Appendix C presents a ‘bluffer’s guide to budgets’ that explains 
the terminology used in budget discussions and this paper.
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2. The value of balanced budgets  
Over the economic cycle of boom and bust, balanced budgets are 
much better than the alternative. Persistent government deficits 
incur interest payments, and limit future borrowings. As a result 
they can unfairly shift costs between generations, and reduce 
flexibility in a crisis. Yet in good times it is hard for governments to 
run a surplus. They are invariably tempted to spend money. Many 
voters prefer outcomes with no identifiable losers.  
Australia has escaped these problems, repairing its debt position 
over the 2000s, supported by public attitudes that were more 
averse to debt than in most other countries. However, there are 
concerns that Australian attitudes may be softening. 
2.1 Balance over the economic cycle 
Balanced budgets over the economic cycle make a big difference. 
Persistent large government deficits incur interest costs. They 
lead to large government debt that can limit future borrowings. 
Some argue that high debt reduces economic growth.2 On any 
view, persistent large deficits can unfairly shift costs between 
generations, and reduce flexibility in a crisis.3 
As many developed countries have rediscovered in recent years, 
high government debt coupled with low economic growth creates 
a terrible economic dilemma. If government increases spending, 
the debt gets worse, markets charge higher interest rates, and 
                                            
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), but see the debate summarised in Economist 
(2010) and Herndon et al (2013) 
3 Kotlikoff (1984) 
borrowing more becomes impossible. If government tries to 
reduce its deficit, GDP slows further, and government debt can 
rise as a proportion of GDP, making the problems worse.4 Their 
successors and financial institutions can then find it difficult to 
borrow at reasonable costs, and economic growth is often slow for 
a long time.5 
How to respond to the trap of low growth and high government 
debt remains contentious. Far better to avoid the trap in the first 
place – which means running balanced budgets over the 
economic cycle. 
Australia will need to run substantial surpluses over the remainder 
of the current economic cycle. During the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), the Australian government aggressively stimulated the 
economy through increased spending to avoid unemployment. 
Some argue that the government should have instead simply 
relied on the ‘automatic stabilisers’ of lower tax collection and 
increased welfare payments.6  Irrespective of views on this 
question, if budgets are to balance over the cycle, then additional 
stimulus in an economic downturn must be matched by additional 
government surpluses during good times.  
It is arguable that continued deficits are sustainable if they are 
small enough that government debt does not increase as a 
percentage of GDP. The burden of interest payments transferred 
                                            
4 De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Figure 5; Summers and DeLong (2012) 
5 Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) 
6 Differing views are canvassed in McDonald and Morling (2011) 
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to future generations can be rationalized if the debt funds 
investments that benefit future generations, or if economic growth 
is greater than the real interest rate. However, there is inevitable 
ambiguity about whether government spending is truly investing, 
or simply spending for current generations. It may also be difficult 
to communicate to voters that recurrent budgets need to average 
substantial surpluses to pay the principal and interest for capital 
works. Nor is there any clear level at which government debt is 
‘sustainable’. As discussed below, political forces for ‘responsible’ 
government are the only real restraint on politically motivated 
spending. A deficit of zero – a balanced budget – may well be the 
only salient number to rally such political forces. 
2.2 Political obstacles to balanced budgets 
It is hard for governments to run a surplus in good times. They are 
inevitably tempted to spend money. In the short term, additional 
spending and tax cuts increase economic growth and reduce 
unemployment. Governments will always find it attractive to 
provide tangible benefits that generate clear winners and obvious 
short term gains.7 By contrast, the benefits of a balanced budget 
are less obvious – the winners are spread widely, and the gains 
are longer term. The short-run matters more in politics because 
election cycles are usually shorter than economic cycles. 
Repair of a budget deficit is particularly difficult because political 
debate favours outcomes that do not create identifiable losers.8 
Spending cuts and tax increases take away existing benefits that 
are typically valued more than the potential gain of a new benefit 
                                            
7 Buchanan and Wagner (1977) 
8 See Megalogenis (2012) and Tingle (2012) 
such as a balanced budget. Reduced spending or higher taxes 
usually affect particular groups that are more motivated to lobby to 
protect their position than groups that represent a more general 
public interest.9 
As a result, few countries ran surpluses through the boom years 
of the 2000s. Most OECD countries ran deficits from 2000 to 
2008, as Figure 2 shows.  
Figure 2: Average underlying general government balance, OECD 
countries, 2000-2008 
per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of OECD (2012a). 
                                            
9 See Leighton and Lopez (2013)  
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If the goal is to run a balanced budget over the economic cycle, 
then many countries – Australia  included – wasted the good 
times, maintaining smaller fiscal balances than one would expect 
given rapid and sustained economic growth  
Instead, governments often only repair budgets in a crisis, with all 
the pain that entails. Worse still, the result is the precise opposite 
of good fiscal policy: governments are boosting the economy 
when it is strong, and holding back when it is weak. 
2.3 Australian attitudes to budget deficits 
Australia and New Zealand are in part exceptions to this pattern, 
at least over the last few decades. From around 1995 they 
produced substantial and sustained surpluses for over a decade, 
reducing net debt rapidly, in contrast to many other developed 
countries (see Figure 3).10 
Ian Macfarlane, then Governor of the Reserve Bank in Australia, 
suggested in 2006 that the average voter in Australia is more 
economically literate than a typical voter elsewhere. This may be 
because Australian media provide more coverage of key 
economic decisions such as Reserve Bank interest rate decisions, 
perhaps because Australian mortgages are more likely to be 
floating rate. Speaking before the GFC, Macfarlane observed that 
this economic awareness helped to produce surpluses in 
Australia; by contrast the United States and many European 
countries were running deficits despite good economic times.11 
                                            
10 For a brief history, see Kamener and Tan (2012) 
11 Macfarlane (2006). It is unlikely that the difference can be explained by the 
additional boost to the Australian economy from the mining boom. From 2003-
Figure 3: General government net debt, 1980-2011 
per cent of potential GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of IMF (2012).  
There are concerns that this public attitude may be eroded by 
several years of budget deficits, and the accompanying rhetoric 
justifying this in both Australia and overseas. Public concern 
about deficits may also be affected by promises for specific costly 
programs and political attitudes projecting a belief in the ability of 
government to cure all social ills (see below at Section 7.1). 
                                                                                    
2008, the US and Europe enjoyed strong economic growth but continued to run 
deficits that materially increased government debt. 
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3. The bottom line for Australian governments 
The combined Commonwealth and State12 budgets are now 
forecast to be close to balanced after substantial deficits through 
the GFC. Both Commonwealth and State governments are 
currently forecasting that things will get better from here, with 
higher revenues and lower expenditures  
3.1 Combining Commonwealth and State budgets 
This paper tries to identify the collective position of 
Commonwealth and State governments. A combined picture 
reveals the real pressures on Australian government budgets, 
which are often obscured by transfers between Commonwealth 
and State budgets.13  
3.2 Trends in the bottom line 
Australian government budget positions deteriorated over the last 
five years through the GFC, as Figure 4 shows. The deterioration 
in 2009 was not surprising: as economic growth slows, 
government budgets should generally move into deficit. As growth 
has picked up since 2009, government budget positions are 
forecast to balance by 2013-14, although these forecasts may be 
                                            
12 Throughout this paper, we use ‘States’ to include both States and Territories of 
Australia 
13 Throughout this paper, we use ‘transfers’ to refer to payments from the 
Commonwealth to the States.  Where we present combined Commonwealth and 
State expenditures, these transfers are treated as State expenditure unless 
otherwise specified. Welfare transfers are called ‘payments’ or ‘benefits’ to avoid 
confusion. Detail on the methodology for analysis of these budgets is presented 
in Appendix B. 
revised. Given economic conditions, they should probably already 
be in surplus (see below section 6.2) 
Figure 4: Australian governments’ historic expenditure and revenue 
per cent of GDP, 2002-03 to 2015-16 
 
Note: Shows total revenue and expenditure for Commonwealth, State and Territory 
budgets. Transfers from the Commonwealth to States and Territories (e.g. GST, Specific 
Purpose Payments, National Partnerships) have been removed from Commonwealth 
expenditure and States’ revenue so they are not double-counted. See Appendix A for 
further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers 2002-03 to 
2012-13; ABS (2012b) Cat. no. 5520.0 Table 30 
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3.3  Commonwealth and State trends 
The combined position of Commonwealth and State budgets is 
often obscured by transfers between them. Transfers are often 
counted as part of both Commonwealth expenditure and State 
expenditure. In our analysis we try to treat transfers consistently 
as part of State expenditure. 
The underlying position of the Commonwealth and States also 
depends on the treatment of GST. The Commonwealth collects 
GST, and includes it in its revenues, but transfers all the proceeds 
to the States. States bear the consequences if GST revenues are 
higher or lower than expected. 
The underlying picture, as shown in Figure 5, is that both 
Commonwealth and State expenditure increased during the GFC, 
and remain well above pre-GFC levels as a percentage of GDP. 
Unlike Commonwealth expenditure, State government 
expenditure is forecast to fall below pre-GFC levels. 
The GFC primarily affected Commonwealth revenue, reducing it 
by almost 3 per cent of GDP. Both Commonwealth and State 
revenue will remain below pre-GFC levels in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Commonwealth and State expenditures and revenues 
per cent of GDP, 2003-2016 
 
Note: Revenue collected by the Commonwealth and transferred to States as specific 
purpose payments is shown as Commonwealth revenue, and as State expenditure. 
Revenue collected by the Commonwealth that is paid ‘through’ the States to other entities 
(e.g. local governments) is shown as Commonwealth expenditure. GST is treated as if it 
were a State revenue source 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers 2002-03 to 2012-13; 
ABS (2012b) Cat. no. 5520.0 Table 30 
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4. Expenditure trends 
4.1 Overall expenditure trends 
Health, welfare, education, defence, and 
infrastructure account for two-thirds of 
Australian government spending, as 
Figure 6 shows.  
The largest three individual spends are 
on old age pensions, hospitals and 
schools.  Collectively, these are 
equivalent to 8 per cent of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: NFS = not further specified.  Other’ comprises all 
other expenditure not elsewhere included, including 
employment, legal, immigration and customs, arts and 
sport, housing, communications, emergency services 
and water.  See Appendix B for further notes, including 
category definitions. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State 
budget papers 2012-13 
Figure 6: Australian governments’ combined expenditures 
Per cent of total, 2012-13 budget 
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Expenditures remain 1 per cent of GDP higher than before the 
GFC. The main cause is health expenditure, which is eating into 
government budgets. Growth in health spending above GDP over 
the past ten years was greater than the growth above GDP of all 
other spending combined, as shown in Figure 7. Infrastructure 
expenditure also grew materially in that time. 
Figure 7: Change in Australian governments’ expenditure 
per cent change above CPI, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Notes: Categories shown are the 10 largest expenditure categories for 2012-13.  ‘Other’ 
comprises all expenditure not elsewhere included, including community services, govt 
operations, superannuation, disability services, climate change & environment, foreign 
affairs, employment, legal, immigration &  customs, arts and sport, housing, 
communications, emergency services, and water. See Appendix B for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2012-13. 
How to read Figure 7 and charts like it 
This report includes a number of charts that illustrate size and 
growth in a single picture. They typically show the dollar amount 
of revenue or expenditure on the horizontal axis, and the 
percentage growth on the vertical axis. 
Categories that are large are wide on the horizontal axis. In 
Figure 7, for example, ‘welfare payments’ are the widest, and thus 
the largest spending category. 
Categories that are growing fast are high on the vertical axis. In 
Figure 7 ‘ageing and aged care services’ are the highest, and 
thus the fastest growing spending category. GDP growth in 
excess of CPI is shown. Categories higher than this have grown 
faster than GDP. In Figure 7 ‘education’ has grown faster than 
GDP, implying that government now spends more on this 
category as a percentage of GDP than in the past. 
Large real increases in dollar terms have a large area on the 
graph. In Figure 7, ‘health’ and ‘welfare’ have the largest areas, 
and thus constitute the largest growth in real dollar expenditure. 
The area above the GDP line represents the growth in dollar 
expenditure above GDP. ‘Health’ has the largest area above the 
GDP line (‘welfare’ by contrast has very little area above the GDP 
line), implying that much of the the dollar increase in spending 
above GDP was on ‘health’. 
The GDP line is not a spending target or benchmark.  High rates 
of spending growth may be unsustainable, and do not tell us 
anything about the value for money of the expenditure. 
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The expense that did most to increase government spending 
above GDP growth was hospital spending, as shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: Large changes in Australian government expenditures  
$bn change relative to GDP growth, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Notes: Categories shown are all those that changed by more than $2bn relative to change 
in GDP.  ‘Infrastructure’ is infrastructure, transport and planning.  ‘Other’ is the net change 
of all categories not shown separately. See Appendix B for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2012-13. 
Infrastructure also increased, in part reflecting over $4 billion of 
reconstruction after the Queensland floods.14 
A number of welfare expenditures also grew materially, but the 
overall welfare category grew much less due to the aggregate 
reduction in payments to working age people, including Newstart, 
Parenting Payment and Youth Allowance.  
The Australian trend for increased government health expenditure 
is mirrored in other countries. In the United States, for example, 
government health spending increased by 2 per cent of GDP, and 
aged pensions by 1 per cent of GDP over the decade to 2011. 
Overall, however, government expenditure in the United States 
jumped by 5 per cent of GDP, driven by trends not matched in 
Australia such as substantially rising spending in defence (1 per 
cent), unemployment benefits (2 per cent) and jails (1 per cent).15 
                                            
14 Queensland Government (2012) 
15 Silver (2013) 
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4.2 Health expenditure 
Health expenses are 19% of Australian government expenditure, 
and grew by 74% in real terms over the last decade.  
Increases in health expenditures are primarily driven not by an 
ageing population, but by people of all ages seeing doctors more 
often, having more tests and operations, and taking more 
prescription drugs, often employing new – and effective 
treatments. These changing practices are costing more per 
person, as Figure 9 shows. 
The increased expenditure appears to be having an impact. Life 
expectancy, particularly for those aged over 65, has increased 
rapidly and consistently over the last 40 years.16 However, it has 
come at a cost. 
                                            
16 Daley et al (2012a), p. 56 
Figure 9: Change in Australian governments’ health expenditure 
$ bn, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Note:  ‘Population growth’ models the effect of the increase in population size with no 
change in the age structure or average per capita health expenditure.  ‘Population ageing’ 
uses age-specific per capita health expenditure data (based on AIHW figures) to model the 
effect of changes in the population structure. ‘Health inflation above CPI’ uses appropriate 
AIHW health price indices to model inflation in each category of expenditure. ‘New, 
improved and more services per person’ is the amount of expenditure that cannot be 
explained by these three factors. 
Source: Grattan analysis of AIHW (2012);AIHW (2012); ABS (2013a) Cat. no. 6401.0 
Tables 1 and 2; ABS (2013c) Cat. no. 3101.0 Table 59. 
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4.3 Education expenditure 
Education expenses are 14% of Australian government 
expenditure, and grew by 48% in real terms over the last decade. 
School education expenses are much larger than other areas of 
education expenditure (Figure 10). Although they grew more 
slowly in percentage terms than other categories such as 
research and higher education, they grew by 37% in real terms 
over the last ten years.17 School expenditure by governments in 
2012-13 is $11.3 billion more in real terms than in 2002-03, the 
fourth largest increase in dollar terms (behind only hospitals, 
infrastructure, and welfare for seniors). Spending on government 
schools has been driven primarily by the reduction in government 
school class sizes, and by the increasing average seniority of 
teachers – which translates into higher pay.18 
School spending by governments as a percentage of GDP has 
fallen slightly.  A smaller proportion of the population is of school 
age than ten years ago. The shift of enrolments into non-
government schools dampened government spending on schools, 
as governments collectively provide less funding per student in a 
non-government school than in a government school. It should be 
noted that there is little evidence that more money for schools 
leads to better student outcomes.19  
Higher education and research have grown significantly, but off a 
much smaller base.  Together they will receive $6.3 billion more in 
                                            
17 Data is for government expenditure only.  In 2009, private expenditure was 
15.9 per cent of total expenditure on schools: see OECD (2012b) 
18 Jensen et al (2011) 
19 Jensen et al (2012) 
real terms in 2012-13 than they did a decade ago.  Government-
funded higher education student numbers have grown by over 34 
per cent in this time.20 
Figure 10: Change in Australian governments’ education 
expenditure 
per cent change above CPI, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Note: ‘Education expenditure not further specified’ is too small to show; it comprised 
$0.9bn in 2012-13. See Appendix B for further notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2012-13. 
                                            
20 DIISRTE(2012); Commonwealth budget papers 2012-13; Norton (2013) 
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4.4 Welfare expenditure 
Welfare is the largest single category of government spending, 
consuming 22% of government expenditure. Welfare spending 
only grew by 34% in real terms over the last decade, more slowly 
than GDP.  
Figure 11: Change in Australian governments’ welfare expenditure 
per cent change above CPI, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Notes: Categories comprise welfare payments directly to the identified group, and related 
administrative spending where identifiable.   ‘Families’ includes family tax benefits, child 
care subsidies, parental leave, baby bonus and schoolkids bonus. ‘Workforce’ comprises 
payments to working-age people, including Newstart, Youth Allowance and Parenting 
Payment. See Appendix B for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2012-13. 
The impact of welfare on the budget may have been somewhat 
higher than is suggested if tax concessions for less well-off 
households are also included. 
Three of the four largest categories of welfare – seniors, disability 
pensions, and family support – all grew by around 50 per cent in 
real terms over the last decade, faster than real GDP, as Figure 
11 shows.  
Welfare did not keep pace with GDP only because the aggregate 
cost of workforce payments such as Newstart, Youth Allowance 
and Parenting Payment fell in real terms. The unemployment rate 
fell, eligibility rules changed, and Newstart and Youth Allowance 
did not keep pace with wage inflation. 
These shifts had substantial human impact. On any measure, 
households on Newstart are doing it tougher than households 
receiving other forms of welfare, as Figure 12 shows.  
Households in which the main income is Newstart or jobseeker 
Youth Allowance are more financially stressed, spend more of 
their income on “basics”, and are more likely to be and remain for 
an extended period in poverty (as defined by the OECD) than are 
other households.21 Households whose main income is Newstart 
or jobseeker Youth Allowance have a median disposable income 
of $305 and $242 a week respectively after paying for housing. 
The median disposable income of households on other 
government payments is $503 a week after paying for housing.22  
                                            
21 Philips and Nepal (2012) 
22 Philips and Nepal (2012), p. 13 
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Figure 12: Households experiencing hardships by main income 
source of household 
Percentage of households in category, 2009-10 
Note: ‘Job seeker payment’ includes Newstart and jobseeker Youth Allowance. ‘Other govt 
payment’ is dominated by age and disability pensions. “Deprivations” (such as the inability 
to afford to invite friends for a meal once a month) and “Financial stresses”(such being 
unable to pay electricity on time) are as defined by the ABS Household Expenditure 
Survey. ‘Poverty” is defined as householders whose income after tax and welfare, and 
paying for housing is less than 50% of the median Australian household: 
Source: Grattan analysis of Phillips and Nepal (2012). 
The real reduction in workforce payments may be partially 
reversed in coming years. There is significant pressure to 
increase the level of Newstart given the stresses now 
experienced by Newstart households.23 Increasing Newstart by 
$50 per week would cost the budget around $2 billion, 0.1 per 
cent of GDP. 
By contrast, disability pensions grew slightly faster than GDP. 
Some of this was the consequence of individuals switching from 
Newstart to the disability support pension (DSP), which pays 
more per week, and does not have the same requirements to 
actively search for work.  
Over half the growth in DSP reflects the claims of older 
households. The total proportion of older households on welfare 
has reduced over the last decade. However, there are more older 
households; older households on welfare are more likely to claim 
DSP rather than Newstart; and DSP now supports some of the 
older households that would previously have received payments 
that have now been phased out, such as mature age allowances 
and widows pensions. These demographic and classification 
effects amongst older households account for over half the growth 
in DSP.24 
Total Age Pension expenditure grew faster than GDP. Welfare for 
seniors is now the largest component of welfare spending. Yet, as 
with health spending, demographic ageing was not the prime 
cause (Figure 13).25 Spending on older people increased rapidly, 
                                            
23 See, for example, Australian Greens (2013) 
24 Whiteford (2011) 
25 See also Productivity Commission (2005) 
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despite an increasing number of people retiring with 
superannuation, as a result of deliberate policy choices to 
increase Age Pension spending. These included the Howard 
Government changes to the assets and income tests in 2006-07, 
the 2008-09 Rudd Government increase to the base pension rate, 
and the 2010-11 Gillard Government Clean Energy Supplement 
accompanying the introduction of the carbon price. The growth in 
spending above GDP was entirely due to discretionary changes 
like these. Whether these policy decisions were appropriate 
depends on many factors, including whether Age Pension 
expenditure was too low in 2003. 
As well as the Age Pension, a number of other government 
expenses and concessions are aimed at older people.  
Concessions for public transport, car registration and third party 
insurance, utilities, rates, and health costs are already substantial. 
Public transport concessions are available to anyone over 60, 
irrespective of income.26 Many other concessions are available if 
any person in a household is entitled to a part pension. The cost 
of these concessions is substantial: they will cost Victoria over 
$518 million in 2012-2013.27 In addition, older people have 
access to additional welfare payments such as the Seniors 
Supplement, and  benefit from substantial tax concessions such 
as the Senior Australians Tax Offset, and superannuation 
concessions. 
                                            
26 Seniors Card (2013) 
27 Victorian Government (2012) 
Figure 13: Drivers of change in Age Pension expenditure 
$bn, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Note:  Until September 2009, the Age Pension was indexed by CPI and benchmarked at 
25% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE).  From September 2009, it was 
indexed by the greater of CPI or the Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (PBLCI), 
and benchmarked to 27.7% of MTAWE. The ‘indexation above CPI’ category shows the 
impact of using the 25% MTAWE benchmark over ten years.  Change in MTAWE has 
been the highest index in 7 of the 10 years between 2002-03 and 2012-13. ‘Demographic 
change’ is based on the increase in the number of people aged 65 and over; this is an 
approximation as in 2002-03 women were eligible for the Age Pension from age 63.5. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012a) Cat no. 6302.0 Table 10C; ABS (2013a) Cat. no. 
6401.0 Tables 1 and 2; ABS (2013b) Cat. no. 6467.0 Table 1; ABS (2013c) Cat. no. 
3101.0 Table 59; FaCS (2002); FaHCSIA (2012); Harmer (2009). 
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5. Revenue trends 
Australian governments are forecast to collect $501 billion in 
revenues in 2012-13, around 33 per cent of GDP. 
These revenues are dominated by income tax, company tax and 
the GST. 
Other taxes – including all those raised directly by the States – 
are relatively small, as Figure 14 shows.  Revenues collected by 
the Commonwealth are now three times larger than revenues 
collected by all the States and Territories combined. 
Commonwealth transfers are almost half of State revenues. 
All major revenue sources dropped during the GFC. Collections 
have since recovered, apart from GST collections, which are likely 
to remain around 0.5 per cent of GDP less than the 2000-2010 
average. Corporate taxes are recovering, but current forecasts 
may overestimate future revenue by about 0.5 per cent of GDP. 
New revenue sources – carbon pricing and the Minerals 
Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) – appear likely to collect substantially 
less than current forecasts. 
Tax expenditures – concessions to general tax provisions aimed 
at a specific policy outcome – now cost Australian governments 
over $130 billion a year in foregone revenue.28 
 
 
                                            
28 Grattan analysis of Treasury (2013) and State government budget papers 
2012-13. 
Figure 14: Australian governments’ revenues 
$ bn, 2012-13 budgets 
 
Note:  Classifications are based on liability rather than incidence, so income taxes’ are 
individual income tax, superannuation taxes and fringe benefits tax; ‘corporate taxes’ are 
company tax, resource rent taxes and payroll tax; ‘other consumption taxes’ are carbon 
pricing, customs, excise and other sales taxes; ‘other taxes’ are mostly agricultural taxes 
for the Commonwealth, and gambling, insurance and vehicle taxes for the States; ‘non-tax 
revenues’ are not further specified for the Commonwealth, and are mostly dividends, 
interest, royalties and sale of goods and services for States; ‘property taxes’ are mostly 
land tax and stamp duty. For Commonwealth transfers to States: ‘untied transfers’ are 
mostly GST; ‘tied transfers’ include Specific Purpose and National Partnership payments.   
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers 2012-13 
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5.1 Commonwealth revenues 
Revenues collected by the Commonwealth are forecast to amount 
to about 24 per cent of GDP in 2012-13. Over the decade to 
2013, all major Commonwealth revenue sources increased in real 
terms, as shown in Figure 15. Company taxes increased relatively 
more, and sales taxes relatively less. 
Figure 15: Change in Commonwealth government revenues 
per cent change above CPI, 2003-2013 
 
Note: ‘Other taxes’ is mostly agricultural taxes; ‘other consumption taxes’ is carbon pricing, 
non-GST sales taxes, customs, and non-fuel excises; ‘income taxes’ is individual income 
tax, superannuation taxes and fringe benefits tax. Non-tax revenues can vary widely 
depending on asset sales. However, the change in non-tax revenue, close to GDP, 
suggests that there are not major anomalies in either 2003 or 2013. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth budget papers 2002-03 and 2012-13. 
However, a 10-year comparison conceals substantial variation 
from year to year. Commonwealth income and corporate tax 
dropped between 2007 and 2013 as the impact of the GFC flowed 
through the economy and then taxation revenues.  Both tax bases 
are projected by Commonwealth Treasury to return to close to 
their 2001-2010 average by 2013-14.  
Figure 16: Variation in Commonwealth major tax revenues 
per cent of GDP above/below average 2000-01 to 2009-10 
 
Note: Individual taxation receipts include individual and income tax withholding; corporate 
includes FBT, super funds, companies and RRT; indirect includes sales taxes, excise and 
customs duty, CPM, and other.  
Source: Commonwealth Budget Paper 1, 2012-13 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260
Resource rent taxes (269%)
$bn received in 2002-03, in $2012
Non-tax revenue
GDP
Income taxes GST
Fuel 
excise
Other taxes
Company tax
Other consumption taxes
Budget pressures on Australian governments 
Grattan Institute 2013 23 
5.2 State revenues 
Revenues received by the States are forecast to amount to about 
14 per cent of GDP in 2012-13. Much of these revenues are 
collected by the Commonwealth and then transferred to the 
States. State governments collect little more than half of what 
they spend, as Figure 17 shows. 
Figure 17: State and Territory government revenues by source 
per cent of total, 2012-2013 
 
Notes: ‘Investment income’ includes interest income, dividends, and tax-equivalent 
payments from State entities. ‘Other own-source’ includes fines, fees, grants from entities 
other than the Commonwealth, and other revenue not elsewhere included. ‘Other general 
purpose grants’ is mostly royalty payments to WA.  
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2002-03 and 2012-13. 
Figure 18: Change in State government revenues 
per cent change above CPI, 2003-2013 
 
Notes: ‘Tied grants from C’wth’ include Specific Purpose Payments, National Partnership 
Payments, payments for on-passing to other entities, and other tied grants. ‘Own-source 
taxation’ includes gambling, land, insurance, vehicle, payroll and stamp duties. 
Investments include interest income, dividends, and tax-equivalent payments from State 
entities. ‘Other own-source’ include fines, fees, grants from entities other than the 
Commonwealth, and other revenue not elsewhere included. ‘Untied grants from C’wth’ in 
2012-13 are mostly royalty payments to WA; in 2002-03, there were mostly National 
Competition Policy payments and compensation payments for loss of revenue from State 
taxes abolished with the introduction of the GST (both have now ceased). 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2002-03 and 2012-13. 
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Over the last decade, State revenues from the Commonwealth 
were under pressure. Tied transfers from the Commonwealth 
increased, but untied transfers – including GST revenues – 
shrank relative to GDP (Figure 18). The gap was filled by State 
charges growing faster than GDP. More detail on State 
government revenues, including variations between large States, 
is in Appendix A. 
5.3 Income taxes 
Income taxes are forecast to be 11.5 per cent of GDP in 2012-13. 
This is close to their long-run average from 2000 to 2010 
Income taxes fell by 2 per cent of GDP from a peak in 2004-05 to 
a low in 2009-10. Revenue fell partly as a result of the GFC 
(including falls in capital gains tax). Revenue also fell with a series 
of rate cuts in 2008-2010 so that income tax in 2010-2011 was 
$10 billion lower than it would have been if the thresholds from 
2007-08 had been indexed at CPI. However, by 2015-16, several 
years of bracket creep will cancel out the annual impact of these 
tax cuts, and income tax collection will be the same as if the 
income tax brackets had simply been indexed at CPI from 
2007-08.29 
There is a reasonable chance that Capital Gains Tax (CGT) 
receipts will increase by about 0.3 per cent of GDP.  CGT is 
collected as income, company and superannuation taxes. 
Collections in 2010 were at a cyclical low of 0.45 per cent of GDP, 
well below the peak of 1.48 per cent of GDP in 2007. However, 
the share market and property price boom of the 2000s should 
                                            
29 Deloitte Access Economics (2012), p. 73 
probably be seen as an aberration; over 15 years, CGT receipts 
averaged 0.72 per cent of GDP.30  
5.4 Corporate taxes 
Corporate taxes are forecast to be about 5.4 per cent of GDP in 
2012-13.  The largest components are company tax (4.7 per cent 
of GDP) and payroll tax (1.4 per cent of GDP). 
Over the last four years company tax revenues were below the 
average for 2000 to 2010. In part, economic growth, and therefore 
corporate profits, were lower than before the GFC. In part 
company taxes were lower because of corporate losses during 
the GFC that were claimed in subsequent years. However, even 
after accounting for these effects driven by economic growth 
rates, company tax collections were still about 0.5 per cent of 
GDP lower than forecast.31 Mining companies paid less tax than 
forecasts, which failed to allow for accelerated depreciation on 
substantial new investments.  
Long-standing tax provisions allow miners to claim depreciation 
not over the life of the mine (say 20 to 30 years), but at double 
this rate (over 10 to 15 years). Most of this surge in depreciation 
claims is likely to continue for another decade at least. Mining 
companies can also claim in the current tax year the entire cost of 
removing over-burden (soil and rock on top of mineable ore in an 
                                            
30 Grattan analysis of Commonwealth 2012-13 Budget Paper No.1, p. 5-6 
31 Chessell et al (2012), p. xxi 
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open cut mine). Data are not readily available on the size of the 
effect on recent company tax collection.32 
Treasury forecasts of company tax did not allow for the specific 
impact of accelerated depreciation on revenues from the mining 
industry. Even after allowing for the difference between forecast 
and actual economic outcomes, company tax revenue would still 
have been around $7 billion (about 0.5 per cent of GDP) lower 
than Treasury forecasts from 2008-09 to 2011-12.33 Presumably 
the currently available Treasury forecasts have built in similar 
errors. If so, the corrections will reduce forecast company tax 
revenues by around 0.5 per cent of GDP.34 
5.5 Indirect taxes 
Indirect taxes – primarily the GST and fuel excise – dropped by 
about 1 per cent of GDP relative to the 2001-2010 average, as 
Figure 16 shows.   
The fall in GST was mainly due to changes in household 
savings.35 In 2003, Australian households were net borrowers of 1 
per cent of ‘discretionary’ (post-tax) income. By 2012 they were 
much more frugal, saving 11 per cent of discretionary income, or 
6.5 per cent of GDP. As Figure 19 shows, this appears to be a 
                                            
32 Whether these tax concessions are justified by their impact on attracting 
mining investment that might otherwise not occur in Australia is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
33 Chessell et al (2012), p. xxi 
34 Chessell et al (2012) 
35 The flow of household savings as calculated by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics includes contributions and net earnings, less withdrawals, for 
superannuation. 
persistent change in behaviour, perhaps driven by a combination 
of historically high debt levels that households are now looking to 
reduce; lower confidence as a result of the GFC; increased 
awareness of rising longevity and the need for additional 
retirement savings; and replacement of the wealth increase 
previously delivered by strong capital gains in housing and 
equities.36  
Figure 19: Household savings 1990-2012 
Household savings ratio, per cent of disposable income 
 
Note: Net household savings includes contributions and net earnings, less withdrawals, for 
superannuation. 
Source: ABS (2012c) Cat no. 5204.0 
                                            
36 Freestone et al (2011) 
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GST revenues also fell because consumers spent an increasing 
proportion of their income on education and health, which are 
exempt from GST, and less on housing construction and 
renovation that are at cyclical lows, with a small loss of tax 
revenue as internet shopping grew.37 
Indirect taxes have also reduced relative to GDP because the fuel 
excise was not indexed after 2001.38  As a result, fuel excise only 
just grew in real terms between 2003 and 2013, despite an 
increasing population, as Figure 15 shows. If fuel excise had been 
indexed in line with inflation over the last decade, revenue would 
be approximately $2.4 billion higher.39 
5.6 New revenue sources 
In the last two years, the Commonwealth legislated two 
substantial new revenue sources: the carbon price and the Mining 
Resource Rent Tax (MRRT). Both appear likely to generate 
substantially less revenue than current forecasts. 
Carbon price revenues are likely to collect around $5.3 billion per 
year (0.3 per cent of GDP) less than current forecasts from 2015-
16 onwards. These forecasts assume a traded price of $29/tonne 
from 2015-16. But current European prices (to which the 
Australian scheme is now linked) are around $6/tonne. If carbon 
prices stay around this level, then revenue for 2015-16 will be 
approximately $1.4bn rather than the $6.7bn in current forecasts. 
                                            
37 Treasury (2012), p. 155 
38 Treasury (2010b), section 9.3. 
39 Fuel tax revenue is currently $10b/yr; under indexation this would be higher by 
the cumulative change in CPI over the last decade of 30%, and assuming a 5% 
reduction in fuel usage due to higher efficiency and fewer trips 
Current forecasts assume the MRRT will raise around $5 billion in 
2013-14, and similar amounts in future. In fact, it may well collect 
almost no revenue. Reported revenues in the first six months of 
operation are close to zero. Collections will depend on minerals 
prices, and many expect that future minerals prices will be at or 
below the levels of the last six months.40 
                                            
40 See Section 6.1 below  
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6. External pressures 
Government budgets benefited from the strong terms of trade 
over the last decade. The prices of goods that generated taxes 
rose more quickly than the price of services that governments 
bought (particularly foreign goods and Australian wages). There is 
a good chance that the terms of trade will fall in the medium term, 
and Australian governments will be looking for 1 per cent, and 
perhaps as much as 2 per cent of GDP in savings or tax 
increases to repair their budget balances as a result.  
Australian government budgets also benefited from generally 
good economic conditions. Three years after the GFC, the 
economy of Australia and its major trading partners are close to 
their long run growth rates.  
Combining these effects, one would expect that Australian 
governments should be running comfortable surpluses at this 
point in the mining and economic cycles to pay back the stimulus 
spending of the GFC, and to absorb the likely hit to budget 
balances when the terms of trade unwind and return to more 
normal levels. Instead Australian governments are relying on 
current minerals prices only declining slowly to maintain even 
current deficits or thin surpluses. They are very exposed to the 
risk of a scenario in which mining investment and earnings slow 
more quickly. 
It is almost inevitable that mining investment and minerals prices 
will reduce from current levels, which are much higher than 
historic averages. As they reduce, nominal economic growth rates 
and government revenues will reduce, increasing the pressure on 
government budgets, at least in the short term. This decline could 
well be much faster than is currently projected. 
Sometimes macroeconomic influences – notably terms of trade 
(see Appendix C) – are described as ‘cyclical’ impacts that mask 
the ‘underlying’ or ‘structural’ budget position. The situation can 
be described as a budget position that is ‘at risk’ from 
macroeconomic changes that are inherently difficult to predict. 
The risk of a significant decline in minerals prices towards historic 
levels is large and plausible. Consequently there is a strong case 
for adjusting budget revenue and expenses sooner rather than 
later to prepare for this. 
6.1 Terms of trade and minerals prices 
The improvement in the terms of trade since 2003 as a result of 
the mining boom is estimated to have added around 1 to 2 per 
cent of GDP to the Commonwealth Government budget balance 
over the last few years, as Figure 20 shows. The publicly reported 
‘cash balance’ was materially higher than the ‘structural balance’ 
(what the budget outcome would have been without cyclical 
economic factors). 
The mechanism for this free kick to the budget was that 
government revenues were boosted by high export prices,41 while 
government expenses were more linked to import prices and local 
wages. The budget balance was thus 1 to 2 per cent of GDP 
                                            
41 McDonald et al (2010) 
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Figure 20: Commonwealth government budget balance 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Note: The cash balance is the balance reported in the budget. Cyclical impacts are the 
effects of cyclical economic variables on revenues and expenses. The cash balance less 
the cyclical impacts is the structural budget balance. Analysis based on core scenario in 
McDonald et al (2010). 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012c) cat. no. 5204.0; ABS (2012d) cat. no. 5506.0; 
Commonwealth budget papers for 2002-03 to 2012-13; McDonald et al (2010). 
higher than it would have been without a mining boom. When 
mining prices return closer to historic levels, these effects will 
unwind. Indeed there are signs that this is already happening.42  
                                            
42 Swan (2013) 
Treasury authors in 2010 estimated that the effect on the budget 
was 1 to 2 per cent of GDP, consistent with estimates compiled 
by the OECD, the IMF, and by Deloitte Access Economics.43 As 
this implies, if terms of trade fall to their long-run average, the 
impact on the Commonwealth budget would be very significant, 
reducing revenues, and the budget balance, by 2 per cent of 
GDP, as Figure 21 shows. 
Figure 21: Impact of terms of trade on Commonwealth tax revenues 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012c) cat. no. 5204.0; ABS (2012d) cat. no. 5506.0; 
Commonwealth budget papers for 2002-03 to 2012-13; McDonald et al (2010). 
                                            
43 Deloitte Access Economics (2013) 
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Current budget forecasts assume that from their peak in 2011-
2012, the terms of trade will decline by 9 percent by 2014-15. 
Treasury then projects that the terms of trade will decline by 16 
per cent from their peak by 2023.44 This additional decline is not 
in the forward estimates, which only forecast the next three years. 
However, the decline may be faster and deeper than this. There is 
every chance that the terms of trade could rapidly decline to 
around halfway between peak and the long-run average. If so, the 
price effect would reduce the Commonwealth budget balance by 
0.6 per cent of GDP below current forecasts, and Treasury 
scenario analysis suggest the flow-on effects on the economy and 
the labour market would be much larger, albeit possibly offset by 
changes in the exchange rate.45 
To be prepared for this scenario, Australian governments would 
need to be running a budget balance 1 to 2 per cent of GDP 
higher than ordinary economic indicators would suggest. As 
discussed below, major economic indicators for Australia and the 
world suggest that the Australian economy is now growing close 
to trend, and governments should have a net budget surplus, 
even without the contribution of the terms of trade. 
Government revenues in some States also benefited from a surge 
in royalties as volumes increased, and some States increased 
royalty rates. Total royalties collected are $10 billion, or 0.7 per 
cent of GDP, so the potential impact on Australian government 
budgets of royalty payments falling with mining prices is relatively 
small.   
                                            
44 Treasury (2010) MYEFO Part 2, p. 25 
45 Treasury (2012) Budget Paper 1, Statement 3, Appendix A 
How significant is the risk of lower terms of trade? It is inherently 
difficult to forecast the minerals prices that drive Australia’s terms 
of trade. Prices may stay stronger for longer given high demand 
from the continuing economic development of a range of 
countries, and relatively slow increases in supply due to the 
consolidation of the global mining industry, declining ore grades, 
and slowing construction.46 However, some analysts, such as 
Goldman Sachs, forecast a decline in iron ore prices from around 
$140 to around $90 a tonne by 2014, based on increasing supply 
from Chinese domestic iron ore mining and steel recycling, as 
well as from committed expansions in capacity by global 
producers, including in Australia.47  
6.2 Economic growth 
Australian economic growth has a material impact on budgets 
from year to year. Just the gap between forecast and actual 
economic growth and prices typically added or subtracted in the 
order of $5 to $10 billion from Commonwealth revenues over the 
last decade.48 
Australia is no longer at the bottom of the economic cycle. 
Instead, the economy is probably at or above the average 
performance that can be expected over the next decade or two. 
GDP growth is close to its average over the 2000s, inflation is 
inside the RBA’s target of 2-3 per cent, and unemployment is 
lower than any recent period outside the boom-years of 
                                            
46 Eslake (2011) 
47 Lelong and Curry (2013) 
48 See Chessell et al (2012) p. xviii, xxi 
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2005-2008.49 Meanwhile, commodity prices are higher than 
during the pre-GFC boom, and terms of trade are higher than 
almost any period in the last 60 years, boosting national income. 
Much of Australia’s good fortune is driven by economic 
performance of its trading partners. While the world economy has 
slowed post-GFC, Australia’s main trading partners have been 
roaring ahead, at growth rates a little below their mid-2000s 
boom. As a consequence, Australian commodity export volumes 
are higher than ever before. Australian iron ore exports are now 
double their pre-GFC level.  
There are some weaknesses in the Australian economy that 
might improve. The high dollar is impeding growth in trade-
exposed industries, particularly manufacturing and international 
services such as higher education. Economic growth may also be 
boosted as new mining capacity beings production. A key will be 
how much of this revenue stays in Australia, either as dividends 
for shareholders or tax and royalties for governments. 
However, economic growth is normally slower after the peak of a 
mining boom than before. The history of previous mining booms 
around the world suggests that manufacturing industries typically 
rebound strongly after the boom. But these rebounding industries 
typically add less to economic growth than is subtracted by the 
slowing resources sector.50 
                                            
49 RBA (2013) 
50 This will be discussed in a forthcoming publication by Grattan Institute, 
authored by Jim Minifie 
Thus the current economic conditions may be about ‘as good as it 
gets’. This implies that Australian budgets should not expect a 
significant improvement from the economy ‘returning to normal’. 
Economic conditions generally close to long-run trends imply that 
at this point in the economic cycle, Australia governments should 
be posting comfortable surpluses. 
Classic Keynesian fiscal policy suggests that a country should 
have budget surpluses when the economy is growing strongly, 
and budget deficits when the risks of stalling are high. This 
approach is codified in the current government’s statement of 
fiscal strategy, ‘to achieve budget surpluses, on average, over the 
medium term’.51 Given this strategy, the substantial budgetary 
stimulus that Australia employed at the bottom of the economic 
cycle needs to be counter-balanced by budget surpluses even at 
mid-points in the economic cycle.  
The budgetary surpluses appropriate at this point in the economic 
cycle are in addition to the buffer that may be needed if Australia’s 
terms of trade reduce, affecting prices in ways that would reduce 
government budget balances by about 1 to 2 per cent of GDP, as 
discussed above (Section 6.1). 
6.3 Other cyclical impacts 
Other cyclical factors did not materially affect Commonwealth 
budgets over the last decade. Productivity, participation, hours 
worked and unemployment did not generally affect the budget 
outcome by more than 0.25 per cent of GDP in any one year, and 
their collective impact has tended to be close to zero, as 
                                            
51 Treasury (2012) Budget Paper 1, Statement 3. 
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Figure 22 shows. Therefore, marginal improvements in 
productivity and GDP similar to those in any year of the last 
decade are unlikely to have a large impact on budget outcomes. 
Figure 22: Cyclical impacts on Commonwealth budget balance 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Note:  Unemployment, participation, productivity and hours worked are typical ‘cyclical’ 
variables: they tend to move with the Australian economic cycle. Terms of trade (TOT) is 
also included here as a cyclical variable, although it is part of a different economic cycle. 
Treating TOT as a ‘structural’ variable would inappropriately imply that future levels are 
relatively certain. Structural GDP is calculated based on an unemployment rate of 5 per 
cent and a long-run terms of trade of .66 (where it was 1 in 2011). The cyclical impacts 
exclude interaction effects between variables. While so-called ‘real’ cyclical variables have 
the potential to affect the budget balance, their recent impact has been dwarfed by nominal 
changes (particularly terms of trade). 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012c) cat. no. 5204.0; ABS (2012d) cat. no. 5506.0; 
Commonwealth budget papers for 2002-03 to 2012-13; McDonald et al (2010). 
6.4 Economic forecasts  
Budgetary forecasts depend on economic forecasts. If economic 
forecasts are systemically optimistic or pessimistic, then the 
medium-term outlook may need to be revised. In the 2000s, 
budget outcomes were often about 1 per cent of GDP better than 
forecast, and since the GFC they have generally been about 1 per 
cent worse than forecast, as Figure 23 shows. 
Figure 23: Actual and forecast underlying cash balance, 
Commonwealth budget 
Per cent of GDP, year of forecast labelled 
 
Source: Commonwealth Budget papers 2002-03 to 2012-13 
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The variations are primarily in revenues not expenses.52 Before 
the GFC, Treasury tended to underestimate the strength of 
growth in the global and Australian economies, and in the terms 
of trade, causing it to underestimate taxation revenue.53 Since the 
GFC. Treasury has generally overestimated the budget outcome 
by about 1 per cent of GDP. About half of this due to 
overestimating the strength of global and Australian economic 
growth.54 
Estimating economic growth is inherently difficult: an RBA 
analysis found that half of its forecasts for GDP growth for the 
following year were out by 1.2 per cent or more. Private sector 
forecasts were similarly inaccurate.55 These forecasting issues 
are likely to balance out over the economic cycle. However, about 
$7 billion per year of the Treasury’s recent forecasting error was 
due to incorrect forecasting of company tax, a systemic error that 
will need to be corrected in future.56 
6.5 Balance sheet risks  
Government net debt is created by year-to-year budget deficits, 
and any major liabilities assumed by government that turn out to 
be unrecoverable. Only financial sector liabilities are likely to be 
material to total government debt, and these are unlikely to 
crystallise given current policy settings. 
                                            
52 Deloitte Access Economics (2013), p. 17 
53 Chessell et al (2012), p. xviii 
54 Chessell et al (2012), p. 37 
55 Tulip and Wallace (2012), p. 40 
56 See above (Section 5.4) 
The Commonwealth sets out its major liabilities in its “Statement 
of Risks”, part of each year’s budget papers. Many of these risks 
are substantial, several are described as “unquantifiable”, but few 
are likely to result in the Commonwealth government taking on a 
debt of tens of percentage points of GDP. Even if the entire 
investment in the National Broadband Network turns out to be 
irrecoverable, it would still only add 3 per cent of GDP to total 
government debt. 
The largest risk is a government assuming the bad debts of major 
financial institutions. During the GFC the Commonwealth 
guaranteed deposits, and provided guarantees for the wholesale 
borrowing of Australian banks. As recent events in Spain, Iceland, 
Ireland and Cyprus have shown, taking on these liabilities can 
add materially to total government debt.  
Australia’s financial institutions remain in relatively good health, 
despite the stresses of the GFC. In part this was good luck, as 
Australia’s banks were short of deposits given Australia’s long-
running negative balance of payments, and so avoided lending to 
sub-prime mortgages or to governments that subsequently 
encountered difficulties. As well, the Australian property market 
did not suffer a rapid collapse. In part this was due to good 
management as many bank managers had been part of banks 
that came near to failing in 1990, and APRA actively discouraged 
more risky lending in the years before the GFC.57 Whether by 
good luck or good management, the failure of a substantial 
financial institution in Australia appears unlikely in the foreseeable 
future given current policy settings.  
                                            
57 McDonald and Morling (2011) 
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7. Future pressures 
In the last decade government budgets absorbed sustained 
increases in expenses, particularly health costs (1 per cent of 
GDP), absorbed substantial cuts to income tax and fuel excise (1 
per cent of GDP), suffered through the GFC, but then benefited 
from both the price and economic effects of the mining boom and 
high terms of trade (2 per cent of GDP). Current forecasts are 
under pressure as revenue from company tax may be lower than 
forecast due to accelerated depreciation (0.5 per cent of GDP). 
Similarly, revenues from new sources – carbon pricing and 
MRRT – may raise less than forecast (0.5 per cent of GDP). 
Future government budgets will come under pressure from rising 
political expectations and specific policy promises. Social and 
economic trends, particularly the increasing demand for health 
services, may also increase pressures. Rising inequality as a 
result of increasing returns to the more highly educated may also 
create pressure for additional welfare spending, although this 
trend is not yet evident in Australia, as it is in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The ageing population will have 
surprisingly little impact over the next two decades, particularly if 
policy reforms to increase workforce participation are put in place. 
7.1 General expectations  
The title of Laura Tingle’s Quarterly Essay, ‘Great Expectations’,58 
aptly captured the political tendency to raise expectations about 
what government can and should deliver. As she pointed out, 
                                            
58 Tingle (2012) 
although governments have relinquished direct control of many 
institutions from running airlines to setting interest rates, political 
rhetoric over the last decade tended to imply that government 
could solve virtually any problem. These expectations were easier 
to fulfil when government revenues continued to rise as a 
percentage of GDP. With budgets under pressure, disappointment 
is more likely.  
There are also community expectations that standards of living 
will continue their 20-year rise, with real incomes per person rising 
at over 2 per cent per year. Through the 1990s, this growth was 
fuelled by productivity improvements. In the 2000s, the terms of 
trade delivered rising standards of living, particularly through 
lower prices for imports – an effect that may well unwind in 
future.59 
Unless there is a substantial sustained jump in productivity 
growth, living standards will rise much more slowly in future. 
There may well then be a political tendency to raise expectations 
that government should fill the gap, although it is unclear that 
government intervention would make much difference. 
7.2 Specific expectations 
Governments have already raised specific expectations on a 
number of issues. Expenditures were committed on the basis of 
mining taxes and a carbon price, but these are likely to raise less 
                                            
59 Gruen (2012) p. 3; Eslake and Walsh (2011) 
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revenue than originally forecast. The total cost of the proposed 
National Disability Insurance Scheme and the Gonski school 
funding reforms will be substantial. There are also calls to 
increase Newstart, and restore defence spending to historic 
levels. Collectively these measures could reduce budget balances 
by around $25 billion, or 1.1 per cent of GDP, within the next few 
years, as Figures 24 and 25 show. 
Both sides of politics have raised specific expectations on a 
number of issues. The ALP has made some big spending 
commitments beyond the forward estimates, including increases 
in school funding, and implementing a national disability insurance 
scheme (Figure 24). The Liberal-National Coalition has promised 
more spending on reducing carbon emissions through ‘direct 
action’, and a more generous paid parental leave scheme. They 
have also committed to abolish the carbon price and mining taxes, 
reducing revenues further below revised forecasts (Figure 25). 
Both parties also face demands for more spending in areas as 
diverse as welfare and defence. Without cuts or new sources of 
revenue, the ALP’s current commitments could reduce budget 
balances by around $17 billion or 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2020, 
while the Liberal-National Coalition’s current commitments could 
reduce them by around $10 billion or 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2020. 
Other proposals – much speculated about, but by no means 
adopted as commitments – could bring the initiatives of both 
parties to around 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2020. 
Figure 24: Budget impact of committed and possible policy 
proposals – Australian Labor Party 
Nominal $ billion 
 
Note: Forward estimates are taken from each jurisdiction’s 2012 Mid-Year Economic and 
Fiscal Outlook or equivalent, and assume current policy settings and forecasts.  Basis of 
policy costings: ‘Better schools’ total announced funding of $14.5 billion phased in over 6 
years to 2019. ‘Disability insurance’ shows full cost of National Disability Insurance 
Scheme progressively phased in over four years from 2016-17. ‘Increase Newstart’ 
assumes an increase to jobseeker welfare payments (Newstart and jobseeker Youth 
Allowance) of $50 per week in today’s dollars, indexed at CPI. ‘Restore defence spending’ 
shows budget impact of a return to 2009-10 spending levels as a percentage of GDP from 
2017. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget and Mid-Year Economic and 
Fiscal Outlook papers, 2012-13; Australian Government Actuary (2012); Australian Greens 
(2013); Carling (2012); DEEWR (2013). 
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Figure 25: Budget impact of committed and possible policy 
proposals – Liberal-National Coalition 
Nominal $ billion 
 
Note: ‘Paid parental leave’ assumes 2010 election commitment costing, less cost of current 
arrangements, phased in over four years from 2015-16 to 2019-20. ‘Carbon direct action’ 
assumes announced cap of $10.5 bn to 2020, less four-year costings from 2010 election 
commitment costing, phased in over four years from 2015-16 to 2019-20.  ‘No carbon tax’ 
shows budget impact of abolishing carbon pricing compared to revenue estimates from 
current scheme based on $6/tonne carbon price. ‘No mining tax’ shows budget impact of 
no mining tax compared to revenue estimates half that currently forecast in MYEFO.   
‘Disability insurance’, ‘Increase Newstart’ and ‘Restore defence spending’ and other 
assumptions are as per Figure 24. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State  budget papers and Mid-Year 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook papers, 2012-13;  Australian Government Actuary (2012); 
Australian Greens (2013);  Carling (2012); Eltham (2011); Karvelas (2010); Loughnane 
(2010); Loughnane (2013). 
7.3 Health costs 
Health dominated the increase in government spending above 
GDP over the last decade. Health costs are likely to continue to 
increase as a percentage of GDP. As discussed above (Section 
4.2), the primary driver of increasing health costs over the last 
decade was not an ageing population, but rather increased 
services for all ages. Without concerted policy changes, these 
trends are likely to continue. The 2010 Intergenerational Report 
(IGR) forecast that health costs would increase by 3 per cent of 
GDP by 2050, with 1.3 per cent of GDP a result of the increased 
scope of health services.60 Actual growth in just the last decade 
was an additional 1 per cent of GDP, and about 2 per cent of GDP 
after adjusting for the terms of trade boom, substantially faster 
than the IGR projection.61 
If the scope of health services continues to increase at the rate of 
the last decade, health will demand an additional 2 per cent of 
GDP of government budgets by 2023. 
                                            
60 Treasury (2010a) 
61 If economy-wide prices grew at the CPI over the past decade, health spending 
would have been about two percentage points above its 2002-3 proportion of 
GDP. As the terms of trade boom lifted economy-wide prices, this meant 
government had additional revenues to pay for increasing health costs. 
However, we expect economy-wide prices to move with CPI over the coming 
decade, with the price of healthcare continuing along its current trend. This 
implies an increase in share of GDP of about 2 per cent by 2022-23. 
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7.4 Welfare 
Welfare is the largest category of government expenditure: 22 
cents of every dollar spent by Australian governments. Future 
budgets are therefore sensitive to changes in welfare spending. 
Welfare payments aim to reduce inequality of outcomes and 
opportunities. According to some economic analysis, some 
political theories, and public choice theory, if incomes before 
taxes and payments become less equal, there is likely to be 
pressure to increase welfare to redress the balance. Although 
these claims are contested, almost all political theories agree that 
welfare payments should enable the most disadvantaged to fulfill 
basic values and pursue worthwhile opportunities. 
Overall inequality in Australia is a little above the OECD average. 
Australia has avoided extremely high earnings for those in the top 
1 per cent. Tertiary graduates earn less of a premium, perhaps 
because the mining boom has kept wages relatively high for those 
with fewer skills. The effects of income inequality are mitigated by 
Australia’s welfare system, which has lower total payments, but 
targets them more towards areas of greatest need than other 
OECD countries. 
The real incomes of poor Australian households have generally 
risen over the last decade. But if the mining boom slows, 
inequality is likely to increase and absolute incomes will grow 
more slowly.  This may increase the pressure for Australian 
governments to spend more on welfare. 
7.4.1 Reasons for reducing inequality 
Unequal incomes are inevitable when some have more luck, 
talent, or industry. Government payments to reduce unequal 
incomes may be justified in a variety of ways.  
From an economic perspective, some argue that less equal 
outcomes reduce total economic growth because they reduce 
economic mobility, dampen economic growth and promote 
excessive borrowing leading to financial crisis and middle-class 
debt. Others argue that inequality enables economic elites to 
capture and exploit government institutions leading to national 
decline. The evidence for all these claims is contested.62 
Political self-interest suggests when incomes are more unequal 
there will be more pressure for welfare payments from which the 
median voter sees the likelihood of gain; conversely there will be 
less political pressure for welfare payments when incomes are 
more equal and the median voter sees more possibility of losing 
from the payments. 
From an ethical perspective, some argue that more equally 
distributed resources are intrinsically a better outcome, other 
things being equal, because they maximise opportunities for all.63 
On this basis, welfare benefits would generally grow with GDP, 
distributing the fruits of economic growth across the community. 
Other philosophers are more focused on ‘disadvantage’ that leads 
to those who are less well-off being unable to fulfill basic values in 
their lives,64 or in Sen’s terms, having fewer opportunities to 
                                            
62 Winship (2013), Wilkinson (2009) 
63 Rawls (1971) 
64 Finnis (1980), p. 174 
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pursue lives that they have reason to value.65 On this theory, 
welfare benefits would generally grow with CPI, but not GDP, 
ensuring that the disadvantaged have access to basic resources 
to pursue opportunities. Over the medium term, additional welfare 
might reflect changes in what is required to pursue opportunities. 
The design of Australia’s welfare system, highly targeted to the 
bottom 20%, appears to have been motivated primarily by this 
latter theory of alleviating disadvantage. However, the indexation 
of the Aged Pension to average weekly earnings implicitly shares 
the benefits of economic growth, irrespective of basic needs. 
7.4.2 Overall inequality 
Household inequality measures the financial resources available 
to each household. It depends on the income of each household 
member, levels of participation, and government welfare 
payments. Household income inequality after taxes and payments 
in Australia is slightly higher than the OECD average, as Figure 
26 shows. 
                                            
65 Sen (2009), p 253-254 
 
Indicators of inequality 
Inequality can be measured in many ways. Two of the more 
common methods are the 80:20 ratio and the Gini coefficient. 
These methods can describe inequality in the distribution of many 
outcomes such as income, consumption, and wealth.  
The 80:20 ratio 
If a country had 100 people, ordered from the person with the 
lowest income to the person with the highest income, the 80:20 
income ratio would be the income of the 20th richest person 
divided by the income of the 20th poorest person.  
Often the calculation averages outcomes around these 
benchmarks. The 80:20 ratios in this report take the average of 
the 76th through 85th percentiles and divide by the average of the 
16th through 25th percentiles. 
The Gini coefficient 
Unlike the 80:20 ratio, the Gini coefficient tries to distinguish 
between consistent trends in inequality, and situations in which 
those at the extremes do particularly well or badly.  
The Gini coefficient is half of the expected difference between the 
income of a randomly selected individual and average income, as 
a percentage of average income. The coefficient is 0 if everyone 
has the same income, and 1 if one person earns everything. Most 
countries have a Gini coefficient for income between 0.25 to 0.45. 
In the late 2000s, Australia’s Gini coefficient for income after taxes 
and payments was 0.33; the US was 0.38, and Sweden was 0.26. 
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Figure 26: Household income inequality after taxes and payments 
in the OECD 
Gini coefficient, late 2000s, household disposable income 
 
Note: Gini coefficient based on equivalised household disposable income (after taxes and 
payments) 
Source: OECD (2013) 
Household income has become less equal in most advanced 
economies over the last decade, as Figure 27 shows. In traded 
sectors, globalisation increased the supply of low-skill, low income 
workers, and reduced their relative wages. Globalisation also 
enlarged markets, and so increased the returns to innovation and 
technology for high skill, high income workers. 
Figure 27: Changes in household income inequality, after taxes and 
payments 
Gini coefficient, income, mid 1990s to late 2000s 
 
Note: Gini coefficient based on equivalised household disposable income (after taxes and 
payments) 
Source: OECD (2013) 
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7.4.3 Earnings inequality 
Earnings inequality is less extreme in Australia than elsewhere. 
Earnings per hour for part-time workers in the bottom decile have 
grown rapidly.66 As well, returns to the top 1 per cent are 
noticeably lower, and have not increased nearly as fast, as in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, as Figure 28 shows.   
Figure 28: Average incomes of the top 1 and 5 per cent 
Multiple of average income for bottom 90 per cent 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Alvaredo et al (2013)  
                                            
66 Greenville et al (2013) p 49. 
Earnings inequality is also reduced by the limited premium for 
higher levels of education in Australia. Although the number of 
jobs requiring higher education grew rapidly over the last decade, 
wages for these roles did not grow much faster than other roles, 
as Figure 29 shows.  
Figure 29: Wages and employment growth by occupation 
Cumulative per cent growth, 1997-2011 
 
Source: ABS (2006) Cat no. 1220.0; ABS (2007) Cat. no 6310.0; ABS (2012f) Cat. no. 
6291.0.55.003; ABS (2013a) Cat. no 6401.0, Tables 1 & 2. 
The increasing supply of graduates appears to have kept pace 
with demand, keeping wages under control. Also, strong demand 
for mining construction workers may have kept wages for less 
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skilled workers relatively high. Resources sector jobs, many of 
them in construction and relatively low skilled, grew from 5 per 
cent to 10 per cent of the Australian workforce over the decade, 
with wages growing much faster than the remainder of the 
Australian economy.67 
Figure 30: Earnings premium for higher education 
Earnings of workers with bachelor degree as a multiple of earnings of 
workers with only upper high school education 
 
Note: Wage premium of education: the ratio of wages for those with a bachelor degree 
over those with an upper secondary education. The Australian values are missing in 
places—linear interpolation has been used.  
Source: OECD (2012b) 
                                            
67 Bishop et al (2013) 
Australia’s experience contrasts with the rest of the OECD, where 
the wages premium for higher levels of education is high and 
growing, as Figure 30 shows. When the mining boom ends 
Australia may well revert to the OECD trend, paying a greater 
premium to those with high levels of education, thereby increasing 
income inequality. 
7.4.4 Participation inequality 
Excluding welfare payments, Australian households with higher 
incomes (in the top quintile) earn 5.4 times more than households 
with lower income (in the bottom quintile).68  
Much of the disparity in household income is a consequence of 
different levels of participation. This is so even when looking only 
at pre-retirement age households and over a period of time that 
reduces the effects of absence from the workforce due to child-
rearing. As Figure 31 shows, households in the 80th percentile by 
income work more than twice as many hours as households in the 
20th percentile. High-income households contain more working-
age adults, a greater percentage of them work, and work more 
hours. This premium is growing. 
                                            
68 ABS (2011) Cat. No. 6523.0. This figure is post taxes and payments; incomes 
are equivalised. 
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Figure 31: Drivers of hours worked per household 
Pre-retirement age households, average over 5-year period 
 
Note: Households were selected if they were in waves 1-10 of HILDA, excluding 
households with members over 65. Households were ranked according to their post-
tax/benefit income over the 5 year period. The 20th percentile is the average of 16th-25th 
percentiles; the 80th percentile is the average of 76th to 85th percentile. Incomes are not 
equivalised. 
Source: Grattan analysis of HILDA. See Summerfield et al (2011) 
The net impact of individual income and participation has been to 
make Australian household incomes less equal over the last 
decade. Even so, incomes have continued to grow strongly 
across the spectrum of households, as Figure 32 shows. 
Households towards the bottom of the distribution have benefited 
from reductions in the unemployment rate, and reasonable wages 
growth.69 An open economy, no banking collapse, and the mining 
boom all contributed. 
Figure 32: Growth in household post-tax real income 
Per cent growth in equivalised household post-tax real income, mean of 
quintile, 2000-2010 
 
Note: The ABS changed its measure of income in 2006 to include fringe benefits, which 
may affect the comparability of income in different periods. See Kecmanovic and Wilkins 
(2011) 
Source: ABS (2011) Cat. no.6523.0 
                                            
69 Greenville et al (2013), p.72-73. 
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7.4.5 Government payments and inequality 
Government payments reduce inequality between households. 
Australian government payments do more to redistribute welfare 
payments to the poorest 20 per cent than any other country in the 
OECD except Denmark.70  
Figure 33: Redistribution of welfare payments in OECD countries 
Public payments to households as a proportion of population disposable 
income, mid-2000s 
 
 
Note: Incomes are equivalised. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Whiteford (2010) 
                                            
70 Whiteford (2013), p.37 
Although Australian government payments are relatively small, 
they are much better targeted towards low-income households, as 
Figure 33 shows. Australian spending on means-tested payments 
is almost double anywhere else in the OECD. As a result, those in 
the poorest quintile in Australia receive 12 times more in cash 
payments than those in the richest quintile. Across the OECD the 
poorest quintile only receives twice as much in cash payments, on 
average. The Australian tax system is also more redistributive 
than the OECD average, meaning that a greater proportion of the 
total tax take is collected from the rich than in comparable 
countries.71 
7.4.6 Indirect redistribution 
Households also benefit indirectly by using services that 
governments provide. In total, the top decile of households by 
income in Australia use the most government services, the bottom 
two deciles use least, and other deciles are roughly equal, as 
shown in Figure 34. Households in the top 6 deciles benefit more 
from education services. Households in the 2nd and 3rd bottom 
deciles benefit more from health services. Much of the disparity is 
because post-retirement households are concentrated in the 
bottom 3 deciles of household income. 
                                            
71 OECD (2008), p.103-105 
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Figure 34: Value of indirect health and education benefits by decile 
$ per household per week, 2009-10 
 
Note: Incomes are not equivalised 
Source: Grattan analysis of Greenville et al (2013) p.86-87 
7.4.7 Real income growth 
The strong growth in income even among poorer households may 
explain why there has been relatively little pressure to increase 
payments to offset the rise in inequality. As Figure 35 shows, 
Australian household incomes grew faster than any other OECD 
country except Ireland over the last three decades, offsetting the 
increase in inequality.  The strong income growth due to both a 
growing economy and the rising terms of trade increased the real 
incomes of even poorer households. A rising tide lifted most 
boats, even if it lifted the top boats more.  
Figure 35: Household income growth and growth differences 
between the top and bottom deciles, OECD 
mid-1980s to late 2000s 
 
Source: Greenville et al (2013)  
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7.4.8 Future inequality 
When the mining boom slows, there is likely to be pressure to 
increase taxes and payments if the gap widens between rich and 
poor households. The rapid growth of inequality in the rest of the 
world suggests that inequality in Australia may grow much faster 
in future, particularly if there is less demand for lower skilled 
workers after the mining boom. If this happens, inevitably there 
will be more calls for governments to increases taxes and 
payments to reduce inequality. These calls are likely to be louder 
if poorer households are not seeing any growth in real income.  
Reducing inequality in these circumstances would impose 
substantial pressures on government budgets, particularly the 
Commonwealth’s, which includes most welfare payments. Even 
with Australia’s highly targeted tax-payment system, if Australia’s 
household income inequality follows its historic trend for another 
decade, it would cost 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of GDP to maintain the 
current level of household income inequality. 
Attempting to maintain current levels of inequality assumes an 
intrinsic value to distributing resources more equally. As 
discussed above, many believe redistribution is justified only if it 
ensures that poorer households are not so disadvantaged that 
they are cut off from significant opportunities. Neverthless, 
attempts to redistribute more widely drive at least some welfare 
payments in practice. For example real spending on the Age 
Pension, after adjusting for the ageing of the population, is $8 
billion per year more than a decade ago. This suggests that the 
estimated budget pressure from welfare increases of 0.5 to 1.5 
per cent of GDP may be conservative. 
The progressive tax system will go some way to maintaining 
budget balances despite growth in inequality and government 
payments. If those on higher incomes earn more, then on 
average, more income tax will be paid on the dollars earnt. 
However, maintaining the current level of inequality in this 
scenario would have a net cost to the budget even if the welfare 
payments were perfectly targeted. The additional tax would 
inevitably be less than the additional payments required to 
maintain current inequality levels. 
Unfortunately, higher taxes and payments inevitably impose 
inefficiencies, and often reduce incentives for workforce 
participation. Policy changes that increase participation rates 
among low-income households can have lower costs and do more 
to reduce inequality, although inevitably there are fewer 
guarantees that such policies will have the desired impact. 
7.5 Ageing 
Many believe the ageing of the population has, or will have, a 
material impact on Australian governments’ budgets.72 They will 
have more impact over the next decade on aged care and health 
as substantially more people move into their 70s and 80s. 
However, the impact on budgets is likely to be relatively small if 
participation continues to increase in line with trends over the last 
decade. Participation may even increase, despite ageing, if older 
age workforce participation is reinforced by policy change to 
increase the age of access to the Age Pension and 
superannuation. 
                                            
72 e.g. Deloitte Access Economics (2013), p.33-34 
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Concern about future participation rates and the impact on 
government budgets was a clear message of the first 
Intergenerational Report (IGR), published in 2002.73 Yet the 
impact of ageing on government budgets depends on both 
demography and workforce participation. If more older people 
work, then economic output is higher, governments collect more 
in taxes, and pension expenses are lower. 
The first IGR assumed that participation rates for men in most 
older age-groups would remain constant.74 These rates had not  
increased in the previous two decades (and indeed participation 
of men in all age groups between 35 and 59 had fallen). However, 
participation rates for men increased substantially between 2002 
and 2012, as Figure 36 shows. While the first IGR did assume an 
increase in female workforce participation, the actual increase 
between 2002 and 2012 for women between the ages of 45 and 
64 was again much higher than projected, and continues to trend 
strongly upward. 
                                            
73 Treasury (2002) 
74 Treasury (2002), p.72-73 
Figure 36: Workforce participation by age group 
% of cohort 
 
Note: 12 month trailing average of labour force participation rate by age cohort 
Source: ABS (2012f) Cat no. 6291.0.55.001 
Besides tax reform, policy reforms to increase participation would 
have more impact on economic output than any other reforms 
identified in our previous publication, Game-changers.75 
Increasing the age at which people qualify for the age pension, or 
are entitled to withdraw their superannuation would substantially 
increase older age workforce participation. Female workforce 
                                            
75 Daley et al (2012a) 
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participation is likely to increase substantially if women with young 
children take home more of their earnings after paying tax, giving 
up welfare benefits, and paying for childcare.  
Without change in the participation rate of each age group, overall 
participation will reduce over the next decade. If participation rates 
of older age groups continue to increase, however, then overall 
participation rates will only fall slightly in the next decade, 
although they will probably fall more substantially thereafter.76 
Policy reforms along the lines of those identified in Game-
changers would more than counteract the impact of demography 
on participation, leading to substantially higher participation than 
there is now, as Figure 37 shows. Indeed, such reforms are 
promising opportunities for governments to improve their medium 
term budget position by increasing participation, and therefore 
increasing income and consumption tax revenues while reducing 
pension expenditure. 
An ageing population will also substantially affect budgets if 
pension benefits and eligibility increase faster than GDP growth. 
The cost of pensions increased substantially over the last decade, 
as discussed above (Section 4.4). Political pressure to continue 
these trends is likely to grow. As the age of the median voter 
increases, a greater proportion of the electorate will have a vested 
interest in broader eligibility and higher benefits for aged 
pensions. In the medium run, this is where an ageing population 
will exert most pressure on government budgets. 
                                            
76 Similarly, see NSW Treasury 2011-12 Budget Paper No.6, section 3-2 
Figure 37: Changes in labour force participation rates 
% of total population who participate in workforce 
 
Note: ‘lower participation due to ageing’ assumes current age-specific participation rate of 
each age cohort. ‘Increased participation of older workers’ assumes participation rate of 
each age cohort continues to increase at 50% of current trends. ‘Super / pension reforms’ 
are to lift age of access to pension and superannuation to 70, as specified and modelled in 
Daley et al (2012a). ‘Increased female participation with childcare/welfare reforms’ 
assumes reforms to tax, welfare and childcare subsidies, as specified and modelled in 
Daley et al (2012a) 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012e); Daley et al (2012a); ABS (2008) 3222.0 T A9. 
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8. Responding to pressures 
Australian governments face big budgetary challenges. As this 
report has shown, governments are likely to post a collective 
deficit in 2012-13, and a budget gap of 4 per cent of GDP may 
well open up in the decade thereafter. How should Australian 
governments respond to the underlying deterioration of their 
budgets over the last decade, and substantial future pressures? 
Smaller government will not necessarily improve Australia’s 
budget balances. Substantial increases in productivity and 
participation, while welcome, are unlikely to grow Australia out of 
trouble. Instead, history suggests that tough policy choices can 
substantially improve government budgets. These could easily be 
big enough to cope with the pressures that built up over the last 
decade, and that are likely to increase over the next one. 
8.1 Smaller government  
Some argue that government books are more likely to balance if 
government is smaller.77 But smaller government is not the 
solution to restoring budget balances. As Figure 38 shows, large 
governments can run budget surpluses and small governments 
can run large budget deficits.  
Nor is there good comparative evidence that Australia’s 
governments, around 34 per cent of GDP, are too large. They are 
among the smallest in the OECD, with expenditures a lower 
percentage of GDP than any country except South Korea or 
Switzerland (Figure 38). 
                                            
77 Cowan, et al (2013); Argus (2013) 
Figure 38: Government expenditures and deficits, OECD, 2011 
Source: Grattan analysis of OECD (2012a) 
Of course, comparisons should bear in mind that Australia has an 
internationally unusual privatised superannuation system. If 
compulsory superannuation contributions were made to a 
government social insurance scheme, as in many other countries, 
Australian government would be about 5% larger78 – still smaller 
than most OECD countries. The major driver of the difference is 
                                            
78 Compulsory superannuation contributions in year ended June 2012 were $82 
billion: APRA (2013) 
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that Australia’s welfare system is much more tightly targeted 
towards low income groups (see above, section 7.4.5). 
Nor is the size of Australian government historically unusual. In 
1920 it reached around 34 per cent of GDP,79 very similar to 
today. The role of government has changed considerably since 
then. It no longer provides electricity, shipping, 
telecommunications and banking services, for example, and 
instead provides much more substantial welfare payments, 
education and health services.80 
Some also argue that smaller government is more efficient in 
achieving social outcomes. This rests on the claim by Tanzi and 
Schuknecht that the optimal size of government for developed 
countries is likely to be less than 30 per cent of GDP.81 They 
argue that government spending higher than that creates few 
additional social benefits. Yet their analysis does not put a high 
value on reductions in inequality. On their own analysis, countries 
with large government generally have less inequality.82  They also 
do not recognise that the costs of larger government depend in 
large part on the design of the tax system and consequent 
deadweight costs.83 With a well designed tax system, government 
can afford to be bigger. 
                                            
79 Vamplew (1987) p 133, 256  
80 see Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) p. 23-49 
81 Ibid p.133-134; Cowan (2013), p. 11 
82 Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), p.112-114; and see the criticisms in D’Ambrosio 
(2001) 
83 The welfare-maximising level of government spending depends on the 
costliness of raising revenues, as well as the cost of purchasing additional 
welfare. For a nuanced discussion, see Feldstein (1997). 
The optimal size of government is driven partly by beliefs about 
what services government should provide, as well as empirical 
experience about which services are prone to such market 
failures that they are better provided by government. For example, 
although government delivers most health services in Australia, 
the outcomes relative to cost are among the most efficient in the 
OECD. Some countries with more privately delivered and funded 
services have worse health outcomes at greater cost.84  
The size of government is also significantly driven by tax and 
welfare design. Government in Australia is relatively small 
because welfare is relatively well-targeted. Although Australian 
governments spend relatively little on cash payments to 
individuals, most payments are targeted to those in the bottom 
quintile, as discussed above (Section 7.4). 
Thus there is no reason why a balanced budget, or more efficient 
government, necessarily requires smaller government. 
Nevertheless, there are some links between them. 
In reducing a government deficit, some expenditures are likely to 
be reduced. It is easier to sell the political pain involved in 
reducing deficits if all interests are seen to bear some of the 
burden. History suggests that successful budget repair invariably 
involves both tax increases and expenditure reductions.85 
A smaller role for government may also improve budget deficits if 
outsourcing leads to public services being provided more 
efficiently. Such outsourcing can impose greater discipline in 
                                            
84 Daley et al (2012b), p. 50-51 
85 Hardy et al (2011) 
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defining, measuring, and rewarding outcomes, and increase 
efficiencies through competition. Shifting to this kind of delivery 
model for social services involves a number of trade-offs beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
8.2 Productivity and participation 
Increasing productivity and participation can improve government 
budget positions. They both increase taxation revenues, and 
reduce welfare payments. Yet any benefits to the bottom line must 
be balanced against any costs needed to increase productivity or 
participation.  
For example, raising the age for access to the Age Pension and 
superannuation is likely to increase participation.86 Such policy 
changes would cost the budget little in the short run, and 
substantially boost budget balances in the medium term. By 
contrast, reducing the effective cost of childcare would come at a 
significant cost to government, even if it substantially increased 
female labour force participation. 
Such productivity and participation improvements are unlikely to 
make a substantial difference to budgets quickly. As the last 
decade shows, cyclical changes in productivity and participation 
have had relatively little impact on the budget balance in any year 
(see above Figure 22). 
Over the decade, productivity growth might increase materially as 
a downturn in the terms of trade and pressure on real incomes 
might motivate increased innovation and efficiency. But it is 
                                            
86 Daley et al (2012a), p.53-55 
unlikely that Australian governments can do much to provoke 
substantial productivity increases (other than tax reform) given the 
successful policies already in place.87 Consequently budgetary 
policy cannot rely on such improvements. 
There is more scope for government intervention to increase 
participation. As shown in Figure 37, changes to taxes and 
payments could increase total participation by up to 2% over a 
decade, although this would require substantial and controversial 
policy reform. 
8.3 Efficiency measures 
Obviously, budget reforms are better if they reduce waste and 
inefficiency, or reduce costs that are large relative to the benefits. 
Realistically, however, budget processes always target such 
opportunities. Many of the remaining opportunities are likely to 
require hard political choices. 
With health the largest single pressure point for government 
budgets, measures to control spending growth are an obvious 
priority. However, there is no expert consensus on which system 
reforms would substantially improve efficiency. There are no 
obvious patterns internationally about which institutional 
arrangements improve efficiency. Australia already has amongst 
the best health outcomes in the OECD for the money spent. 88 
There are a substantial number of budget programs, often 
individually small, that many believe deliver relatively little for their 
                                            
87 Daley et al (2012a) 
88 Daley et al (2012b). p.50-51 
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cost. Identifying and eliminating such programs may be a major 
opportunity, although inevitably every program has a constituency 
with a vested interest in maintaining it. To rationalise a large 
number of small programs depends on devising an effective 
process for a large number of small programs. 
8.4 Institutional arrangements 
Australia substantially reformed its Commonwealth budget 
institutions over the last fifteen years. The Charter of Budget 
Honesty Act 1998 requires governments to specify their long-term 
fiscal objectives, the key fiscal measures for assessing this policy, 
and the fiscal targets. The Charter also requires the production of 
three comprehensive reports per year, as well as an economic 
and fiscal outlook before each election, and an intergenerational 
report at least every five years. The system of forward estimates 
requires rolling projections of all revenues and expenditures for 
three years beyond the next budget, including reconciliation with 
the previous year’s estimates.89  
The problems described in this report have accumulated in 
Australia despite these institutions. 
More recently, the Parliamentary Budget Office was created to 
provide independent and non-partisan analysis of the budget 
cycle, fiscal policy and the financial implications of budget 
proposals. In its first year of operation, it is too early to assess its 
impact. However, the Parliamentary Budget Office was to some 
extent modeled on the Congressional Budget Office, which makes 
a substantial contribution, but has not prevented the US 
                                            
89 For a summary of these processes, see Blöndal et al (2008) 
government accumulating large deficits and debt regarded by all 
parties as unsustainable.  
A potential further reform would be an independent and public 
institution that reviewed all budget proposals in advance, aiming 
to reduce programs with poor returns. There would inevitably be 
concerns about the interactions between such a body and the 
political priorities of elected governments. However, the 
effectiveness of such an institution would be limited if in practice it 
simply spawned a new industry of invariably favorable 
‘evaluations’. Many would argue that the requirements for 
regulatory impact statements, with the parallel aim of reducing 
regulatory burdens, have not prevented long-term growth in 
legislative volumes. Alan Stockdale, former Treasurer of Victoria, 
who oversaw substantial spending reductions in the 1990s, 
suggested that a centralised process to vet every program, such 
as that attempted in the United States under Reagan, was 
doomed to fail.90  
Instead, significant budgetary reform in practice tends to result 
from a combination of fiscal crisis, public concern, and hard (but 
often blunt) processes involving senior politicians with the 
authority to make tough trade-offs.91 
Reconsidered federal arrangements might make a difference. 
Some argue that Australia’s mismatch between how much States 
raise and how much they spend may reduce economic growth.92 
Others argue that the mismatch may increase the likelihood of 
                                            
90 Stockdale (2012), comparing his approach with Stockman (1986) 
91 See Kamener and Tan (2012); Veldhuis et al (2011) 
92 Twomey and Withers (2007), but compare Drummond (2009) 
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higher deficits, because it reduces the political incentives for 
responsible budgeting decisions.93 Commonwealth-State 
agreements may also make budgetary reform harder if they 
require States to maintain existing levels of real expenditure.94 On 
the other hand, Australia’s States have a track record of 
competing to attract business by reducing the rates of taxes they 
control,95 even when the outcomes are unsustainable. Reformed 
federal arrangements will be considered in more detail in our 
forthcoming report on potential solutions to Australia’s budget 
pressures. 
8.5 Policy choices 
In contrast to some European countries, Australian demography is 
not destiny. In some European countries demography has driven 
increasing pension liabilities and lower participation, leading to 
historic levels of debt and extended periods of slow economic 
growth. Along with struggling financial institutions, these 
outcomes have constrained budget choices. Australia has far 
more policy flexibility. 
Australia’s last decade suggests that policy choices can drive 
budget outcomes in the medium term. Over the last four years, 
the Commonwealth Government made budget choices with a 
cumulative annual impact of around $60 billion in the medium 
term, as Figure 39 shows. But this is the gross impact. Spending 
cuts, tax increases, and tax law changes were matched by an 
                                            
93 Eyraud and Lusinyan (2011) 
94 e.g. with the National Plan for School Improvement (the ‘Gonski reforms’), the 
Commonwealth proposed a condition that States maintain their existing level of 
expenditure, indexed at 3 per cent per year: Gillard and Garrett (2013) 
95 Parkinson (2012) 
almost exactly equivalent amount of spending increases, tax cuts, 
and increases in tax expenditures. The net impact is only 
projected to be positive due to the revenues planned from the 
carbon price and Minerals Resource Rent Tax, which are likely to 
be much less than originally forecast (see Section 5.6 above). 
Figure 39: Impact of Commonwealth discretionary budget 
measures 
$ billion impact of 2008-2009 to 2012-13 measures on 2013-14 budget 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth budget papers, MYEFO, PEFO, and UEFO, 
2008-9 to 2012-13; Swoboda (2012) 
Note: Where possible, RSPT (mining tax mark I) and CPRS-related data have been 
removed from the analysis, as both policies have been reversed. Ongoing spending from 
2008-09 and 2009-10 budgets and MYEFOs has been inflated at 5.5 per cent per year to 
put in 2013-14 budget terms. 
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In health, education and welfare – as with government 
expenditure and revenue in general –specific policy measures 
over the last five years have made the big difference to budgets. 
Most increased expenditures in these areas resulted from policy 
choices to provide more services or increase payments. 
Demographic and macroeconomic forces had relatively less 
impact. 
In terms of future spending, explicit policy choices will again drive 
budget outcomes. As discussed above (Section 7.2), forecast 
budget recoveries will be swamped by planned policy changes.  
Since health, welfare, and education dominate Australian 
government expenditure, it will be hard to reduce future deficits 
without substantial reforms in these areas. They are obviously 
politically sensitive, but Australian governments have few other 
choices. 
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9. Conclusion  
Australian government budgets are under pressure, and are likely 
to deteriorate. Policy choices, both good and bad, made by both 
Commonwealth and State governments, will ultimately decide the 
result.  
As this report has highlighted, growth in health expenditures is the 
biggest single challenge for budget sustainability. Identifying 
opportunities to improve efficiency in the health sector will be a 
focus of Grattan Institute’s Health Program.  
More generally, budget reform will require tough choices, revised 
institutional arrangements, and different mindsets that make hard 
changes politically feasible.  
Defining these will be the subject of a Grattan Institute report in 
the coming months. It will outline plausible policy choices that 
could have a substantial impact on budgets. Many of the 
proposals often cited – such as reduced family support payments 
or staff cuts in Commonwealth departments – may have less 
budget impact than is widely imagined. On the other hand, tax 
expenditures are large potential targets, but are invariably 
politically difficult to change.  
Our next report will also identify the institutional arrangements 
needed for substantial budget reform. Reconsidered federal 
arrangements, tighter budget rules, and better processes have all 
been proposed.  We will examine whether change is needed in 
the way Australian governments manage their budgets.  
The report will investigate the mindsets of policymakers and the 
public that have been important in achieving substantial budget 
reform in the past. Do we need a broader understanding of the 
scale of the budget challenge? Do all interests need to be seen to 
contribute to reform? And do we need to acknowledge that there 
will have to be many ‘losers’ from reform, at least in the short 
term, to realize the long-term wins for everyone? 
It has been orthodoxy over the last decade for governments to 
‘buy’ reform, accompanying any budget pain with a budget gain. 
The GST, the carbon pricing reforms, and school funding have all 
been advocated as leaving all but the wealthiest ‘no worse off’. In 
a decade of rising government revenue, exceptional economic 
growth, and rising prices for Australian minerals, governments 
could afford this approach. 
The future is going to be more difficult. There are far more 
negative than positive forces. Clawing back a budget deficit of 4% 
of GDP requires that everyone bears some budget pain. This will 
be politically difficult, but the alternative is unsustainable budget 
deficits that will be even more painful to reverse in the future. 
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Appendix A: Detailed budget analysis 
Figure 40: Commonwealth government expenditure by policy area, 2012-13 
Per cent of total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Includes funds transferred to States.  NFS = not 
further specified.  ‘Other’ comprises all other 
expenditure not elsewhere included, including 
government operations, climate change and 
environment, communications, housing, disability 
services, criminal justice, water, legal, arts and sport, 
and emergency services.  See Appendix B for further 
notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth budget 
papers 2012-13. 
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Figure 41: State government expenditure by policy area, 2012-13 
Per cent of total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Based on NSW, Queensland and Victorian data.  
NFS = not further specified.  ‘Other’ comprises all other 
expenditure not elsewhere included, including ageing 
and aged care, water, and employment. See Appendix 
B for further notes. 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers 2012-
13. 
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Figure 42: Government expenditure, 2012-13 
Expenditure category 
Total Australian 
government 
expenditure 
(See figure 6) 
Commonwealth 
expenditure 
(excluding transfers to 
States) 
State expenditure 
(See figure 41)  
Commonwealth 
expenditure 
(including transfers to 
States) 
(See figure 40) 
 $bn % of exp. $bn % of exp. $bn % of exp.  $bn % of exp. 
Ageing and aged care services 12.95 2.6% 11.20 3.8% 1.75 0.8%  11.91 3.2% 
Arts and sport 3.33 0.7% 1.10 0.4% 2.23 1.1%  1.10 0.3% 
Climate change and environment 6.23 1.2% 2.41 0.8% 3.81 1.8%  2.59 0.7% 
Communications 2.42 0.5% 2.42 0.8% - -  2.43 0.6% 
Community Services 11.60 2.3% 5.12 1.7% 6.48 3.1%  5.18 1.4% 
Criminal justice 15.20 3.0% 1.31 0.4% 13.89 6.7%  1.31 0.3% 
Debt management 15.76 3.1% 11.78 4.0% 3.98 1.9%  11.79 3.1% 
Defence - military capability 27.42 5.4% 27.42 9.2% - -  27.45 7.3% 
Defence - military operations 1.34 0.3% 1.34 0.4% - -  1.34 0.4% 
Defence - intelligence and national security 1.93 0.4% 1.93 0.7% - -  1.94 0.5% 
Defence - other 0.16 <0.1% 0.16 0.1% - -  0.16 <0.1% 
Disability services 7.34 1.5% 0.74 0.2% 6.60 3.2%  1.98 0.5% 
Economy and finance 15.80 3.1% 5.22 1.8% 10.58 5.1%  5.47 1.5% 
Education - early childhood 1.50 0.3% - - 1.50 0.7%  0.53 0.1% 
Education - higher education 9.87 2.0% 8.83 3.0% 1.03 0.5%  8.85 2.4% 
Education - tertiary NFS 0.61 0.1% 0.61 0.2% - 0.0%  0.62 0.2% 
Education - schools 42.35 8.4% 8.93 3.0% 33.42 16.1%  13.80 3.7% 
Education - skills 9.31 1.8% 1.73 0.6% 7.59 3.7%  3.34 0.9% 
Education - not further specified 0.20 <0.1% 0.02 <0.1% 0.18 0.1%  0.02 <0.1% 
Emergency services 2.45 0.5% 0.02 <0.1% 2.44 1.2%  0.15 <0.1% 
Employment 4.73 0.9% 3.95 1.3% 0.78 0.4%  3.95 1.1% 
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Expenditure category 
Total Australian 
government 
expenditure 
(See figure 6) 
Commonwealth 
expenditure 
(excluding transfers to 
States) 
State expenditure 
(See figure 41)  
Commonwealth 
expenditure 
(including transfers to 
States) 
(See figure 40) 
 $bn % of exp. $bn % of exp. $bn % of exp.  $bn % of exp. 
Foreign affairs 6.77 1.3% 6.77 2.3% - -  6.78 1.8% 
Government operations 10.73 2.1% 2.61 0.9% 8.13 3.9%  2.61 0.7% 
Health - hospitals 38.05 7.5% 3.40 1.1% 34.65 16.7%  17.84 4.7% 
Health - other 14.51 2.9% 5.47 1.8% 9.04 4.4%  5.93 1.6% 
Health - pharmaceuticals 10.93 2.2% 10.93 3.7% - -  10.94 2.9% 
Health - primary care and medical services 28.47 5.6% 21.58 7.3% 6.89 3.3%  21.76 5.8% 
Health - not further specified 1.57 0.3% 0.71 0.2% 0.86 0.4%  0.71 0.2% 
Health - private health insurance 4.67 0.9% 4.67 1.6% - -  4.67 1.2% 
Housing 3.77 0.7% 0.65 0.2% 3.11 1.5%  2.38 0.6% 
Immigration and customs 4.04 0.8% 4.04 1.4% - -  4.05 1.1% 
Industry 17.12 3.4% 11.11 3.7% 6.01 2.9%  11.13 3.0% 
Infrastructure, transport and planning 35.80 7.1% 2.85 1.0% 32.95 15.9%  6.37 1.7% 
Legal 4.35 0.9% 0.91 0.3% 3.44 1.7%  1.10 0.3% 
Research 5.11 1.0% 4.96 1.7% 0.15 0.1%  4.97 1.3% 
Superannuation 13.19 2.6% 8.20 2.8% 4.99 2.4%  8.21 2.2% 
Untied transfers to States - - - - - -  48.40 12.9% 
Water 1.85 0.4% 0.77 0.3% 1.07 0.5%  1.11 0.3% 
Welfare payments - disability 16.65 3.3% 16.65 5.6% - -  16.67 4.4% 
Welfare payments - family support 26.14 5.2% 26.14 8.8% - -  26.17 7.0% 
Welfare payments - seniors 36.62 7.3% 36.62 12.3% - -  36.66 9.7% 
Welfare payments - carers 6.16 1.2% 6.16 2.1% - -  6.17 1.6% 
Welfare payments - other 1.99 0.4% 1.99 0.7% - -  2.00 0.5% 
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Expenditure category 
Total Australian 
government 
expenditure 
(See figure 6) 
Commonwealth 
expenditure 
(excluding transfers to 
States) 
State expenditure 
(See figure 41)  
Commonwealth 
expenditure 
(including transfers to 
States) 
(See figure 40) 
 $bn % of exp. $bn % of exp. $bn % of exp.  $bn % of exp. 
Welfare payments - not further specified 6.80 1.3% 6.80 2.3% - -  6.81 1.8% 
Welfare payments - workforce 16.90 3.3% 16.90 5.7% - -  16.92 4.5% 
TOTAL 504.68 100.0% 297.13 100% 207.54 100% 
 
376.27 100% 
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Figure 43: Change in Commonwealth government expenditure 
per cent change above CPI, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Notes: Categories shown are the largest expenditure categories for 2012-13. Includes 
transfers to States.  ‘Other’ comprises all expenditure not elsewhere included, including 
(from largest to smallest) foreign affairs; infrastructure, transport and planning; economy 
and finance; community services; immigration and customs; employment; government 
operations; climate change and environment; communications; housing; disability services; 
criminal justice, water; legal; arts and sport; and emergency services. ‘GST’ comprises all 
untied transfers to States, which includes approx $1.1bn in non-GST payments in 2012-13.   
See Appendix B for further notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth budget papers for 2002-03 and 2012-13. 
Figure 44: Change in State government expenditure 
per cent change above CPI, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Notes: Based on NSW, Queensland and Victorian data. Categories shown are the largest 
expenditure categories for 2012-13.  ‘Other’ comprises all expenditure not elsewhere 
included, including (from largest to smallest) industry, debt management, climate change 
and environment, legal, housing, emergency services, arts and sport, ageing and aged 
care, water, superannuation and employment. See Appendix B for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2002-03 and 2012-13. 
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Figure 45: Change in total government health payment expenditure 
by sub-category, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
per cent change above CPI 
 
Notes: ‘Other’ comprises health workforce capacity; medical research; mental health; 
population health; community health; and preventative health. ‘NFS’ is expenditure that is 
not further specified. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, state and territory budget papers for 2002-03 
and 2012-13. 
 
Figure 46: State and Territory expenditures by policy area 
$ billion, 2012-13 
 
Note:  ‘Other’ comprises all other expenditure not elsewhere included, including industry, 
debt management, climate change and environment, legal, housing, arts and sport, 
emergency services, ageing and aged care, water, superannuation and employment. See 
Appendix B for further notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers 2012-13. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50
Hospitals Other
Private health 
insurance
Pharmaceuticals
Primary care and 
medical services
$bn spent in 2002-03, in $2012
NFS
GDP
Budget pressures on Australian governments 
Grattan Institute 2013 61 
Figure 47: State and Territory revenues by source 
$ billion, 2012-13 
 
Notes: ‘Own-source taxation’ includes gambling, land, insurance, vehicle, payroll and 
stamp duties. ‘Investments’ include interest income, dividends, and tax-equivalent 
payments from State entities. ‘Other own-source’ includes fines, fees, grants from entities 
other than the Commonwealth, and other revenue not elsewhere included. ‘Other untied 
grants from the C’wth’ are mostly royalty payments to WA.  
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2012-13. 
Figure 48: Change in Australian government expenditure by policy 
area and level of government, relative to GDP growth 
$bn change relative to GDP growth, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
 
Notes: ‘Infrastructure.’ is infrastructure, transport and planning. Categories shown are the 
10 largest expenditure categories for 2012-13.  ‘Other’ comprises all expenditure not 
elsewhere included, including (from largest to smallest) community services, government 
operations, superannuation, disability services, emergency services, foreign affairs, climate 
change and environment, employment, legal, immigration and customs, arts and sport, 
housing, communications, and water. See Appendix B for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2012-13. 
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Figure 49: Change in Australian government expenditure by policy 
area and level of government, relative to CPI growth 
$bn change relative to CPI growth, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
 
 
Notes: ‘Infrastructure.’ is infrastructure, transport and planning. Categories shown are the 
10 largest expenditure categories for 2012-13.  ‘Other’ comprises all expenditure not 
elsewhere included, including (from largest to smallest) community services, government 
operations, superannuation, disability services, emergency services, foreign affairs, climate 
change and environment, employment, legal, immigration and customs, arts and sport, 
housing, communications, and water. See Appendix B for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2012-13
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Figure 50: Change in Australian government expenditure by policy sub-category, relative to CPI growth 
$bn change relative to CPI growth, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ‘Infrastructure’ is infrastructure, 
transport and planning.  See Appendix 
B for further notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of 
Commonwealth and State budget 
papers for 2002-03 and 2012-13. 
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Appendix B: Budget analysis approach
This note applies to the data presented in Figures 4, 6-11, 14-15, 
17-18 and 40-49, and the accompanying text.  
B.1 Expenditure analysis methodology 
The data in this paper represents our best efforts to date in 
breaking down budget expenditure by policy area.   Our approach 
has been to categorise all general government expenditure listed 
in the Portfolio Budget Statements (for the Commonwealth), and 
equivalent budget documents for the States, using budgeted 
figures for 2002-03 and 2012-13.   
Our expenditure categories differ from those used in the ABS 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which are used to develop 
the ‘expenses by function’ data published in the Commonwealth 
budget,96 and equivalent State government papers in their 
Uniform Presentation Frameworks. See Section B.2 below for a 
further explanation of our categorization approach. 
Assumptions and caveats are as follows: 
x The expenditure analysis is based on Commonwealth, NSW, 
Victorian and Queensland budget data. Other State and 
Territory expenditures for each category are assumed to be 
proportionate to the included States as a percentage of each 
State or Territory’s total expenditure. We believe this is a 
reasonable approximation.  In 2012-13, NSW, Victoria and 
                                            
96 Refer to Budget Paper 1, Statement 6: Expenses and Net Capital Investment. 
Queensland together comprise 74 per cent of State and 
Territory expenditure.  With the addition of Commonwealth 
expenditure, the analysis includes 91 per cent of Australian 
government expenditure. 
x Determining total government expenditure in Australia is 
complicated by federal financial relations, which involves 
transfers of funds from the Commonwealth to the States.   We 
have removed the double-counting of expenditure that would 
result from simple addition of jurisdiction totals.  For all charts 
showing combined Commonwealth and State expenditure: 
- Commonwealth transfers to States (approx. $79bn in 2012-
13) have been included as State expenditures only.   
- Some funding (approx. $11bn in 2012-13) is also paid by 
the Commonwealth ‘through’ the States to other entities 
(mostly non-government schools and local governments).  
This is sometimes known as ‘on-passings’. As States have 
no discretion over this funding, it is classified as 
Commonwealth expenditure in this paper, and is also 
removed from the total expenditure from each State where 
the published total includes on-passings. 
In both cases, we have used Commonwealth figures for 
transfer amounts for consistency. 
x The analysis includes all non-capital (recurrent) expenditure 
listed in the budget papers.  It does not include capital 
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expenditure.  Capital expenditure is relatively small; in 2012-
13 it is approximately $8bn for the Commonwealth (mostly in 
defence), and $29bn for States.  The distinction between 
capital and non-capital expenditure in the budget papers is 
partly an accounting issue; a lot of expenditure that would be 
considered ‘capital’ in everyday discussion (e.g. 
Commonwealth funding for university buildings) comes from 
the government in the form of recurrent grants that are not 
classified as capital in the budget papers.  This expenditure is 
included in this analysis, as it appears as recurrent spending. 
x For each jurisdiction, our expenditure data sums to a figure 
greater than the published expenditure total.  This is because 
our data includes some transfers between agencies in the 
same jurisdiction that cannot be identified from publicly 
available information.  The majority of the difference between 
our data and the published budget totals is accounted for by 
these transfers.  Each jurisdiction lists the total amount of 
these transfers; once these are subtracted from our totals, and 
on-passings are accounted for, the difference between the 
published totals and our totals are small as a proportion of the 
published expenditure total: 
-  Commonwealth  2002-03 – 2.4% 2012-13 – 2.2% 
- NSW 2002-03 – 0.6% 2012-13 – 6.4% 
- Queensland 2002-03 – 4.2% 2012-13 – 3.2% 
- Victoria 2002-03 – 3.6% 2012-13 – 6.8% 
In each case, the unidentified transfers have been spread 
across all categories, in proportion to the size of the 
categories.  In other words, the share of expenditure for each 
category derived from the decomposed data has been applied 
to the published budget total for that jurisdiction.    
B.2 Expenditure categorisation 
While the vast majority of expenditure is straightforward to 
categorise, there will always be a few items that could legitimately 
be included in more than once place.  A good example is 
spending on police forces, which could be placed either in 
‘emergency services’ or ‘criminal justice’ – we have chosen the 
latter, and applied it consistently to all jurisdictions across time. 
We have not used Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
expenditure categories. GFS categories do not provide sufficient 
detail in some areas, and classification of expenditure is not 
always transparent, or consistent over time and between 
jurisdictions.  For example, in 2002-03 Youth Allowance payments 
to students were classified as welfare expenditure; in 2012-13 
they are classified as education expenditure.   We have 
consistently applied our policy categorisations across jurisdictions 
and across years to the greatest extent possible, within the 
limitations of the way data is presented in the budget papers.   
Figure 48 provides descriptions of the types of expenditure 
included in each category.  The list is illustrative rather than 
comprehensive.  The operational costs of departments have been 
included in the relevant category. 
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Figure 51: Description of expenditure categories 
Category Commonwealth States and Territories 
Ageing and aged care 
services 
Home-based, residential and flexible care for the aged Home-based, residential and flexible care for the aged 
Arts and sport Arts and sports programs; expenses for national museums, 
galleries and libraries 
Arts and sports programs; expenses for state museums, galleries, 
libraries and sports facilities 
Climate change and 
environment 
Climate change and environmental protection programs and 
agencies; natural resource management; Bureau of Meteorology 
Climate change and environmental protection programs and 
agencies; parks and wildlife 
Communications ABC, SBS, communications regulation and programs ICT industry programs 
Community services Community care and support services, including for veterans, 
children, and indigenous Australians.  Excludes services 
specifically for the aged and people with disability, and housing 
expenditure 
Child protection and out-of-home care; community care and support 
services; Indigenous support services; support for specific groups 
including women, youth and veterans. Excludes services specifically 
for aged and people with disability, and housing expenditure 
Criminal justice Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other criminal justice 
agencies 
Police forces; crime prevention; corrections and custodial services 
Debt management Cost of government debt Cost of government debt 
Defence - military 
capability 
Defence personnel, equipment, and general operational costs n/a 
Defence - military 
operations 
Specific military operations n/a 
Defence - intelligence and 
national security 
Department of Defence spending on intelligence capabilities; 
ASIO; ASIC; some AFP and other security agencies 
n/a 
Defence - other Some veterans’ support services; Australian War memorial n/a 
Disability services Community care, services and support for people with disability. 
Excludes most disability services expenditure, which is transferred 
to States. Excludes employment services for people with disability. 
Supported accommodation and services for people with disability. 
Economy and finance Australian Tax Office; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, policy and budget advice in the Department of the 
Treasury and Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Economic, financial, regulatory and insurance services and advice to 
government; revenue collection. 
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Category Commonwealth States and Territories 
Education - early 
childhood 
Access to early childhood education; excludes child care subsidies Early childhood education and development services, where 
separately identifiable from schools 
Education - schools General funding to non-government schools; funding for specific 
programs in government and non-government schools. Excludes 
general funding for government schools, which is transferred to 
States. 
General funding to government and non-government schools; 
curriculum and assessment services. 
Education - skills Apprenticeships; funding for specific programs. Funding to TAFEs; other vocational education expenses. 
Education - higher 
education 
Funding to universities for teaching costs and associated 
programs; loan programs (HELP). 
Funding for health-related teaching and research 
   
Education - tertiary not 
further specified 
Nation Building Fund – Education Investment Fund special 
account; tertiary ABSTUDY 
n/a 
Education - not further 
specified 
Education support for children of veterans Departmental expenses not elsewhere included 
Emergency services Emergency and disaster management Fire and rescue services; emergency preparedness and management 
Employment Employment services and programs; workplace safety and 
insurance; entitlements and redundancy schemes; industrial 
relations programs and agencies. 
Workcover, long service leave and workers’ compensation agencies; 
industrial relations. 
Foreign affairs Diplomacy, consular services, development assistance (AusAID) n/a 
Government operations Operating costs, salaries and entitlements for Parliament; 
agencies with functions across government, including the ABS, 
ANAO, DPMC, APSC; payments and services for local 
governments and Territories. 
Operating costs, salaries and entitlements for Parliament; shared 
services functions; agencies with functions across government, 
including DPC, audit and ombudsman’s offices; public service 
commissions. 
Health - hospitals Hospital services for veterans; blood and organ donation 
agencies.  Excludes general funding for hospitals, which is 
transferred to States. 
Inpatient hospital services and emergency health services 
Health - private health 
insurance 
Private health insurance rebates and associated expenses n/a 
Health - pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme; veterans’ pharmaceutical 
services; other pharmaceuticals and aids and appliances 
programs. 
n/a 
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Category Commonwealth States and Territories 
Health - primary care and 
medical services 
Medicare benefits, other programs supporting medical services Primary and community-based services 
Health - other Health workforce capacity, medical research, mental, population, 
community and preventative health 
Mental, population, community and preventive health; rehabilitation 
services 
Health - not further 
specified 
Some health department expenses not elsewhere included; Nation 
Building Fund – Health and Hospitals special account 
Some health department expenses not elsewhere included 
Housing Affordable housing, Defence home loans, indigenous housing First 
Home Saver Accounts. Excludes majority of affordable housing 
funding, which is transferred to States. 
Housing assistance; social housing; indigenous housing; First Home 
Owner Grants; rates rebates. 
Immigration and customs Visas and migration; asylum seeker management and detention; 
quarantine and export services, settlement services 
n/a 
Industry Funding and support services to industry, including fuel tax credits 
and rebates, and  R&D tax credits; subsidies to particular 
industries, including agriculture, coal, renewable energy and 
automotive. 
Funding and support services to industry; subsidies to particular 
industries; rural and regional economic development; investment 
facilitation and attraction. 
Infrastructure, transport 
and planning 
Building Australia Fund; roads funding; aviation and maritime 
programs and agencies; local infrastructure projects 
Road transport; public transport; public works; planning and land 
management. Includes funding for Queensland flood reconstruction. 
Legal Courts, commissions and tribunals; legal services to government.  Courts, commissions and tribunals; legal services to government; 
legal aid; related programs and agencies for fair trading, state 
trustees, liquor and gaming regulation and licensing, and privacy. 
Research Funding to universities for research expenses; other research 
agencies e.g. CSIRO, ARC. Excludes medical research via the 
NHMRC. 
Funding to research agencies 
Superannuation Public sector superannuation payments and administration; low 
income super contribution; other superannuation programs and 
agencies 
Public sector superannuation payments and administration 
Untied transfers to States GST; royalty payments to WA and NT. n/a 
Water Regional and urban water Water and sewerage 
Welfare payments - 
disability 
Disability Support Pension; disability payments for veterans; 
Mobility Allowance; related program support and other expenses 
n/a 
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Category Commonwealth States and Territories 
Welfare payments - family 
support 
Family Tax Benefit Parts A and B; Child Care Benefit; Child Care 
Rebate; Paid Parental Leave; Schoolkids Bonus; Baby Bonus; 
related program support and other expenses 
n/a 
Welfare payments - 
workforce 
Newstart Allowance; Youth Allowance; Parenting Payments; 
Austudy; related program support and other expenses 
n/a 
Welfare payments - 
seniors 
Age Pension; Widow Allowance; Seniors Supplement; Wife 
Pension (Age); related program support and other expenses 
n/a 
Welfare payments - carers Carer Payment; Wife Pension (DSP); related program support and 
other expenses 
n/a 
Welfare payments - other War & Defence Widows Pension and related veterans’ 
compensation; related program support and other expenses 
n/a 
Welfare payments - not 
further specified 
Income support pensions for veterans not elsewhere included; 
delivery expenses not elsewhere included (Centrelink and DHS) 
n/a 
   
B.3 Revenue analysis methodology 
Revenue analysis uses budgeted revenue data from all 
jurisdictions for 2002-03 and 2012-13. It does not require the 
adjustments outlined above as we have adopted the revenue 
categories used by government. 
We have removed the double-counting of revenue that would 
result from simple addition of jurisdiction totals. For all figures 
showing combined Commonwealth and State revenue, funds 
collected by the Commonwealth and then transferred to the 
States have been counted as Commonwealth revenues only 
unless otherwise noted.
B.4 GDP growth relative to CPI 
In the expenditure growth charts like Figure 7, we use a measure 
of GDP growth as a point of comparison for spending growth. This 
GDP measure is deflated by the CPI deflator. The purpose of this 
conversion is to allow the reader to interpret categories that 
exceed the line as increasing in share of the economy in nominal 
terms, while still allowing a rough comparison of spending 
categories across time. 
In reality, the prices of various spending categories do not follow 
the CPI, and so we should only use the CPI-adjusted spending as 
a guide to real spending changes. 
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B.5 Future budget pressures
The assumptions underpinning Figure 1 and the associated text are as follows: 
Figure 52: Estimates of effects on future government budget balances 
Component Size of 
effect  
(per cent 
of GDP) 
Basis for estimate Discussion in 
report 
Forecast surplus 
2015-16 
1.0% Grattan Institute analysis of nominal budget forecasts in Commonwealth and State budget papers. Assumed 
annual 5.5% nominal growth in GDP 2013 to 2016. 
Section 7.2 
Signature 
initiatives 
0.5% to 
1.0% 
ALP commitments (better schools, and disability insurance) estimated to cost nominal $17 billion by 2020 (0.7% of 
GDP). Possible responses to future challenges (increases to Newstart and jobseeker Youth Allowance,  and 
restoring defence spending)  estimated to cost nominal $8 billion (0.3% of GDP) 
LNP commitments (paid parental leave, carbon direct action, abolishing the carbon price, and abolishing the 
mining tax) estimated to cost nominal $10 billion by  2020 (0.4% of GDP). Possible responses to future challenges 
(disability insurance, increases to Newstart and jobseeker Youth Allowance,  and restoring defence spending)  
estimated to cost nominal $17 billion by 2020 (0.7% of GDP) 
Section 7.2 
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Component Size of 
effect  
(per cent 
of GDP) 
Basis for estimate Discussion in 
report 
Health costs 2.0% Over the last decade, health costs have increased more quickly than national output – health spending now forms 
a larger portion of GDP than before. This appears to be a feature of rich countries with ageing populations. Health 
is a luxury good—one that forms a larger percentage of consumption as incomes rise.97 As a country becomes 
richer, its citizens prefer another year of life to another proverbial sports car. 
On nominal terms, the increase in health spending grew in share of GDP by about 1 per cent. However, the price 
of minerals increased much faster than the price of health, and so minerals production grew its share of GDP in 
nominal terms. If economy-wide prices had increased at the same rate as health prices, health share of GDP 
would have increased by almost 2 per cent. 
For the coming decade, we do not expect another large terms of trade boom, and so expect economy-wide and 
health prices to be roughly matched. However, we also expect the trends in real health spending to continue. For 
this reason, we expect government health spending to increase in share of GDP by about 2 per cent. 
Section 7.3 
Higher welfare 
costs 
0.5% to 
2.0% 
Decreases in inequality per dollar spent on welfare were higher in Australia than in any other OECD country.98 We 
assume that this high level of targetting continues, and that the cost of decreasing inequality scales with GDP. This 
gives us a price of decreasing inequality in terms of welfare budget. Assuming that the counterfactual Gini index 
grows at the same rate as the last decade, this gives an increase in inequality, which is multiplied by the price in 
terms of welfare spending to arrive at a number of around 2 per cent of GDP. However, under a progressive 
taxation system and increasing incomes at the top, some of the decreases in inequality will be had by the tax 
system. Therefore we project a cost of 0.5% GDP as a sensible baseline. As a check, this is similar in magnitude 
to the increase in Age Pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the last decade that is not explained by CPI or 
ageing (Section 4.4). 
Section 7.4 
                                            
97 Hall and Jones ( 2007) 
98 OECD (2008); Greenville et al (2013) 
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Component Size of 
effect  
(per cent 
of GDP) 
Basis for estimate Discussion in 
report 
Company tax 
below forecast 
0.5% According to the Treasury’s review of forecasting methodology and performance,99  the errors in forecasting 
company tax revenues with perfect foresight about macroeconomic conditions were about $7bn a year for the last 
five years, or around half a per cent of GDP. This is likely due to poor forecasting of the accelerated depreciation 
granted to mines, and the immediate write-down of over-burden removal. That is, the last few years has seen a 
disconnect between pre-tax profits and tax revenues. We expect the Treasury to incorporate these past errors in 
future forecasts of company tax revenue. 
Sections 5.4, 7 
MRRT & ETS 
below forecast 
0.5% to 
1.0% 
Carbon price revenues are likely to collect around $5.3 billion per year (0.3 per cent of GDP) less than current 
forecasts from 2015-16 onwards. These forecasts assume a traded price of $29/tonne from 2015-16. But current 
European prices (to which the Australian scheme is now linked) are around $6/tonne. If carbon prices stay around 
this level, then revenue for 2015-16 will be approximately $1.4bn rather than the $6.7bn in current forecasts. 
Current forecasts assume the MRRT will raise around $5 billion in 2013-14, and similar amounts in future. In fact, it 
may well collect almost no revenue. Reported revenues in the first six months of operation are close to zero. 
Collections will depend on minerals prices, and many expect that future minerals prices will be at or below the 
levels of the last six months. 
Section 5.6 
Potential terms of 
trade fall 
1.0% to 
2.0% 
We extended the McDonald et. al.100 model of structural budget position to include more recent data. This 
suggests there is currently a cyclical surplus or between 1 and 2 per cent of GDP—depending on the assumption 
of the level of “structural” terms of trade. A reversal of the cycle (which would almost certainly occur due to a sharp 
fall in the terms of trade) would decrease government revenue by this cyclical amount. 
Section 6.1 
General 
assumption 
0 We assume that all other revenues and costs grow proportionately with GDP n/a 
Total decline in 
budget position 
4.0% to 
8.0% 
n/a n/a 
                                            
99 Chessell et al (2012) 
100 McDonald et al (2010) 
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Appendix C:  A bluffer’s guide to budgets 
C.1 General economic and financial terms 
Gross domestic product, or GDP is a measure of the size of a 
country’s economy. In 2012-13, Australia’s GDP is forecast to be 
approximately $1,520 billion or $1.5 trillion.101 
Inflation measures how much prices have increased over time. It 
is often measured by the change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) that tracks the prices of what a typical household buys.  
As a result of inflation, a loaf of bread costs more today than 
several years ago. Consequently, $1 today buys less than $1 
bought in 2000. Nominal prices are the prices you see in the 
shop at the time. Real prices remove the effects of inflation so 
that a dollar has a constant value – it buys the same number of 
loaves of bread in any year. Real prices provide more meaningful 
comparisons of spending in different years. Real prices are often 
expressed in dollar values for a particular year, e.g. 2012 dollars. 
In the context of budgets, nominal spending is the amount listed 
in the budget papers each year.  Real spending removes the 
effect of inflation so we can compare how spending has actually 
changed.  For example, if government purchases medicines that 
increase in price by 3 per cent each year, and government 
spending increases at 3 per cent per year, government buys the 
same amount of medicine every year. While its nominal spending 
grows at 3 per cent each year, its real spending is constant.   
                                            
101 Treasury (2012) MYEFO 
A price deflator converts nominal values into real values, and is 
based on a measure of inflation.  The nominal price divided by the 
price deflator is the real price. 
Production is how much is produced in an economy. Economic 
growth measures the increase in production from time to time. 
Productivity measures how much is produced by a given input. 
Labour productivity, for example, measures how much is 
produced per hour worked. Capital productivity measures how 
much is produced for every dollar invested. Productivity growth 
measures how much more is produced with the same inputs. 
The labour force participation rate is the proportion of working-
age adults (16 years and older) who are either working or looking 
for work. The labour force includes the unemployed, but not 
people who are retired, institutionalised, or at home caring for 
children. 
Australia, like most developed countries, has an ageing 
population. People are living longer on average, so a greater 
proportion of the population is older. This demographic change 
is likely to have big effects on society over time, affecting 
participation rates, tax collection, and government spending, 
particularly health and aged pensions 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is a Paris-based think-tank whose 
members and funders are rich countries. It includes most 
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developed countries.  
C.2 Macroeconomics 
Many measures of economic activity – such as GDP, 
unemployment and interest rates -- move in cycles. During a 
boom, economic output increases, unemployment drops, and 
interest rates typically rise. Conversely, during busts, 
unemployment increases, interest rates fall, and GDP growth 
slows (or becomes negative). This is known as the economic 
cycle. 
The terms of trade is the ratio of export prices to import prices for 
a country. Crudely, it measures the tonnes of coal Australia must 
export in order to import a plasma-screen TV. When terms of 
trade rise, Australia earns more plasma screen TVs per tonne of 
coal. If terms of trade fall, Australia would need to export more 
tonnes of coal to buy the same number of televisions. 
From the mid-2000s, increased international demand for 
Australian minerals raised their price relative to other goods. 
Mining became very profitable. More mines were dug, increasing 
employment in the mining sector, as well as related industries 
(such as construction). Increasing demand for Australian minerals 
contributed to the rise in the value of the Australian dollar. These 
effects together are known as the mining boom.  
The global financial crisis (GFC) is a common term for the 
financial crisis of 2007-08, which led to the 2008-12 global 
recession. Australia fared considerably better than most of the 
developed world during and after the crisis, but even so, 
economic growth slowed and government budgets were placed 
under greater pressure than in earlier years. 
C.3 Budgets 
C.3.1 Revenue 
Revenue is all money the government collects. It is made up of: 
x Taxes, including: 
- Income taxes – taxes paid by individuals on their earnings 
- Company tax – taxes paid by companies on their profits.  
When firms purchase new equipment, they are not generally 
allowed to deduct the entire cost from their revenues all at 
once. Instead, they allocate a portion of the investment to 
each year of its useful life. For some types of asset, 
Australian tax rules allow accelerated depreciation: firms 
can claim a greater share of the initial investment cost each 
year than the usual portion. This means that firms claim the 
cost of the capital more quickly, and so the firm’s cost of 
investing decreases. Because firms pay less tax while they 
are claiming this greater portion of costs, accelerated 
depreciation reduces government revenues in the short 
term. 
- Sales taxes – such as the Goods and Services Tax 
- Excises – sales taxes levied on a particular product, such 
as fuel, cigarettes, or alcohol.  
- Customs duties - taxes on imported items, including 
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clothing and cars 
- Other taxes, including resource rent taxes (‘mining taxes’) 
and carbon pricing. 
x Sale of goods and services 
x Income received from investments, such as dividends from 
government-owned companies, and interest. 
x Royalties – In Australia, states own resources and mining 
companies purchase them. Royalty revenues are the sales of 
these minerals to mining companies. Royalties are generally 
levied either as a fixed rate per tonne, or as a percentage of 
the total value. 
x Grants from other levels of government 
C.3.2 Expenditure 
Expenditure is all money the government spends. It includes: 
x Payments to individuals, such as the Age Pension and 
unemployment benefits.102  
x Transfers to other levels of government 
                                            
102 These payments are sometimes called ‘transfers’ or ‘welfare transfers’.  This 
report uses ‘transfers’ to refer to payments by the Commonwealth to the states; 
welfare transfers are called ‘payments’ or ‘benefits’ to avoid confusion. 
x Purchases of goods and services. This includes purchase of 
physical goods as needed, as well as the purchase of services 
from many different entities. For example, a government might 
purchase job retraining services from a private company or 
not-for-profit organisation rather than employ staff directly to 
deliver the training. 
x Salaries and other expenses for employees, including front-
line staff such as teachers and nurses as well as 
administrative staff. 
C.4 Terms used in the budget papers 
Commonwealth and State governments in Australia each publish 
a collection of documents every year in May or June that set out 
the government’s economic and fiscal plans for the next year. 
These are generically called the budget papers. 
Since economic conditions change through the year, governments 
also update their estimates of revenue and expenses late in the 
year. The Commonwealth update is called the Mid-Year 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). They also publish an 
updated set of figures before each election in the Pre-election 
Fiscal Outlook (PEFO). State governments publish equivalent 
documents under different names. 
Budget papers generally contain figures for revenue and 
expenditure for the previous financial year, the current financial 
year (sometimes called the budget year), and the next three 
financial years. This three-year period is called the forward years 
and the figures are known as the forward estimates.  
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Figures for the previous, current and next financial year are 
generally presented as estimates. Sometimes figures for the past 
year are presented as actual figures and the current year as 
budgeted figures. The figures for the final two years of the 
forward estimates are generally presented as projections. 
Government expenses and revenues vary with the economic 
cycle. During a boom, profits and incomes increase, resulting in 
more taxes being paid; unemployment also falls, reducing 
expenses. During a bust, the opposite happens. The cyclical 
balance component of the budget is the proportion of revenues 
and expenses that occur due to the economic cycle. Once we 
subtract this from the cash balance, we arrive at the structural 
balance. Determining the cyclical balance depends on modelling 
assumptions about the relationship between the economic cycle, 
expenses, and revenues. 
C.6 Surplus, deficits and debt 
A budget deficit occurs when a government collects less in 
revenues than it spends in any given year. A budget surplus 
occurs when revenues are greater than expenditures in a year. 
Government debt is the total debt that a government owes, and 
may come from governments running deficits several years in a 
row. Gross debt is the total amount of debt the government has. 
Net debt is the gross debt minus the value of assets the 
government owns (such as the Future Fund). 
C.7 Federal financial relations 
In Australia, the Commonwealth government collects most of the 
taxes, while State governments deliver most of the services. To 
correct this imbalance, the Commonwealth transfers money to the 
States in several ways: 
x Some funding, such as the money collected via the GST, is 
given to States as untied funding.  It can be spent however 
the State chooses. 
x Most of the rest of the funding is given to the States as tied 
funding. This funding is given to the States on the condition 
that they use if for a particular purpose. There are two types of 
tied funding: Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) are 
relatively large amounts of money to be spent in general 
areas, such as schools or housing. National Partnership 
Payments (NPPs) are smaller amounts of money more 
closely tied to a particular policy goal, such as improving 
literacy and numeracy, or mental health reform. 
x A small amount is paid by the Commonwealth ‘through’ the 
states to other bodies, mostly non-government schools and 
local governments. States do not control how this money is 
spent; they just pass it on to the Commonwealth-identified 
recipient. These payments are sometimes known as on-
passings. 
In this report, we use the term ‘transfers’ to refer to untied and 
tied funding from the Commonwealth to the States.  Where we 
present combined Commonwealth and state expenditures, these 
transfers are treated as state expenditure unless otherwise 
specified. On-passings are always treated as Commonwealth 
expenditure. 
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